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Executive summary 
• ASEAN is the most prominent regional cooperation group in East Asia. Australia has had 
a multilateral relationship with ASEAN since 1974. In July 2008 Australia appointed an 
Ambassador specifically to ASEAN and in August together with New Zealand signed a 
free trade agreement with ASEAN. This paper surveys ASEAN’s evolution and recent 
development and Australia’s relations with it. 
• ASEAN was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. ASEAN’s cooperation style stressed respect for national sovereignty, avoiding 
confrontation, reaching agreement through consensus and proceeding at a pace all 
members were comfortable with. ASEAN after 1995 accepted four new members 
(Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) which bolstered its claim to represent Southeast 
Asia, but increased the diversity within the Association and made some areas of 
cooperation harder to pursue. ASEAN members were affected adversely by the Asian 
financial crisis from 1997, but this also stimulated the Association to renew and expand its 
own cooperation efforts. 
• Since the late 1990s, ASEAN has pursued cooperation in three major ways.  
– First, ASEAN in 2003 adopted a commitment to develop an ‘ASEAN Community’ 
among its own members. This involves ‘three pillars’: the ASEAN Economic 
Community; the ASEAN Political-Security Community; and the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community. The paper outlines these Communities and also assesses some 
major challenges facing ASEAN in implementing these goals, particularly its troubled 
relations with Myanmar, and its efforts to consolidate its own institutional identity by 
adopting its first Charter.  
– Second, ASEAN, has continued to engage the major powers in political and economic 
dialogue to enhance the overall security and prosperity of Southeast Asia, placing 
special emphasis on the ‘big three’ Asia-Pacific powers, the United States, China and 
Japan.  
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– Third, ASEAN, is sponsoring wider regional cooperation by playing a leading role in 
the ASEAN Regional Forum to build confidence and enhance dialogue on security 
issues, the ASEAN Plus Three grouping of the ASEAN ten, China, Japan and South 
Korea (whose activities have stressed financial cooperation) and the East Asia Summit, 
a leadership dialogue bringing together ASEAN with China, Japan, South Korea, India, 
New Zealand and Australia. The paper reviews recent developments in each group. 
• The paper suggests that ASEAN has established a substantial profile but faces challenges 
in maintaining its influence and credibility. In pursuing the ‘ASEAN Community’, the 
Association’s longstanding emphasis on national sovereignty can impede pursuit of 
complex economic integration programs and inhibit implementing commitments made 
under the new Charter, such as establishing a human rights body for ASEAN. If ASEAN 
is not able to secure convincing progress in its economic and political cooperation, then it 
may come to lose cachet as a leading force in wider regional cooperation, which could be 
pursued increasingly by other major actors in more focused and activist groupings. 
• Since 1974, Australia has benefited from ASEAN’s contribution to maintaining inter-state 
stability in its region. Relations have expanded substantially since 2004 and can benefit 
further from ASEAN’s integration programs, to which Australia can now be more closely 
linked through the promise of the new trade agreement. ASEAN is also a key part of the 
‘regional architecture’ which the Australian Government wishes to see enhanced. 
Australia therefore has an important ongoing stake in ASEAN’s progress in building its 
own community and in contributing to wider regional cooperation.  
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Introduction 
ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) is the premier regional association in 
East Asia and the most prominent regional grouping in the Third World. Since its 
inauguration in 1967, during the height of the wars in Indochina, ASEAN has come to be 
regarded as an important factor for stability in Southeast Asia through its own cooperative 
activities, its policies of maintaining active dialogues with the major powers and other Asia-
Pacific countries, and its promotion of wider cooperation forums in East Asia and the Asia-
Pacific. In 1974 Australia was the first country to establish a multilateral relationship with 
ASEAN. Australia’s interests in ASEAN have been reaffirmed by the Rudd Government, 
which in July 2008 appointed an Ambassador to the Association. 
After its cautious beginnings in 1967, ASEAN gained a substantial regional and international 
profile in the 1970s and 1980s when it pioneered economic cooperation in Southeast Asia and 
also played an important political role in both the Indochina refugee crisis (from 1978–79) 
and the conflict over Cambodia (after 1978). Since the late 1990s, ASEAN has made 
substantial efforts to maintain its profile and prominence. After the end of the Cambodia 
conflict and with Cold War tensions reduced in East Asia, ASEAN was able to realise the 
intentions of the founders by moving to accept Vietnam (in 1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) 
and Cambodia (1999) as members, so that the group could now represent Southeast Asia 
overall. However, the wider membership increased the diversity within ASEAN and made 
economic integration harder to pursue. While most new members accepted the ASEAN ‘rules 
of the game’, Myanmar’s intransigent autocratic regime has damaged ASEAN’s cohesion and 
its international image. ASEAN’s prestige was compromised by the adverse regional impact 
of the Asian financial crisis (from July 1997), which reduced growth rates in many members. 
ASEAN has also been challenged by the rise of China and India, whose size and high growth 
rates have attracted high levels of attention from foreign investors and trading partners. 
As ASEAN enters its fifth decade, it is seeking to reaffirm and redevelop its strategies for 
cooperation in three major ways. First, among its ten members ASEAN is pursuing some 
enhanced cooperation goals which it adopted in 2003 and which are aimed at developing a 
closer ‘ASEAN Community’ in economic, political and socio-cultural terms. Second, 
ASEAN is moving to redevelop its organisation and style of cooperation, particularly by 
adopting a Charter to give the association a distinct legal identity and a more ‘rules-based’ 
mode of operation. Thirdly, ASEAN is also seeking to be a ‘hub’ for cooperation in the wider 
East Asia region, by continuing to develop the ASEAN Regional Forum (initiated in 1994), 
the ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ grouping (which since 1997 has brought together the ASEAN ten 
and China, Japan and South Korea), and the East Asia Summit (comprising the 13 ASEAN 
Plus Three countries along with India, Australia and New Zealand, which met for the first 
time in December 2005).  
ASEAN’s efforts towards reform and enhanced cooperation are significant for the region and 
also for Australia, for whom the ASEAN states are both major economic partners and a key 
focus for regional multilateral dialogue in political and security terms. This paper provides a 
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guide (or ‘road map’) to ASEAN’s major cooperation efforts and renovation proposals, and 
to its ongoing policies in promoting dialogue in the East Asia and Asia-Pacific regions 
overall. The paper will suggest that in pursuing renovation, ASEAN faces some difficult 
challenges in adapting its cooperative style and mode of operations. A major issue is that the 
principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’, which was a bedrock value for ASEAN’s 
members when establishing the Association, is now in danger of being an obstacle to the 
closer cooperation which many in ASEAN see as necessary to maintain the Association’s 
relevance and credibility. 
The paper will discuss the background to ASEAN’s origins and evolution since 1967; the 
pursuit since 2003 of an ‘ASEAN Community’ in economic, security and socio-cultural 
terms; ASEAN’s key relationships with its external ‘dialogue partners; ASEAN’s 
contributions to wider regional cooperation through the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
ASEAN Plus Three process and the East Asia Summit; and Australia’s relations with 
ASEAN since 1974. 
Background: ASEAN and regional cooperation from 1967 
A central characteristic of cooperation efforts in East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific regions 
is that they have involved multiple groupings and forums rather than a set of overarching and 
inclusive institutions, such as those developed in Europe by the European Union.1 This 
institutional diversity has resulted partly because of the great variety among the regional 
states, which vary from Japan to Laos. The diversity has also stemmed from the fact that 
sensitivities and competition in relations among the major powers (especially the US, China 
and Japan) have impeded development of the common ground and trust necessary for a 
regional group with comprehensive membership to be able to emerge and operate effectively. 
As a result, a number of groups and forums with differing and sometimes overlapping 
memberships have emerged and have operated simultaneously.  
ASEAN, is an association of Southeast Asian states which has operated alongside other 
groups, both inter-governmental and non-official or semi-official. The Asia Pacific Economic 
                                                 
1.  ‘Regions’ in international politics are often not geographically defined but socially-constructed 
entities, and appropriate definitions of them are frequently contested. For the purposes of this 
paper, the term ‘East Asia’ refers to the states of Southeast Asia along with China, Japan, and the 
two Korean states. The term ‘Asia-Pacific’ commonly refers to those just mentioned states, along 
with other interested countries including, Russia, the United States, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Pacific islands and some states in Latin America who have declared significant 
identities in this wider region. In this paper, unless otherwise stated, ‘Asia-Pacific’ will refer to 
the member countries of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC—see next 
footnote). For recent comparative analyses of East Asia and Asia-Pacific cooperation groupings 
see William A Tow, Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia, Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, Canberra, July 2008 and Alan Gyngell, ‘Design faults: the Asia Pacific’s regional 
architecture’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 18 July 2007 at 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=638 
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Cooperation (APEC) grouping is an association of economies inaugurated in 1989 which has 
21 members in East Asia, North America and Latin America.2 APEC was founded with a 
commitment to trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation but since 1993 its scope 
has widened to include an annual leaders meeting and its discussions have extended to 
include political and security issues. Other inter-governmental groups have included the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (established in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) which has interests focussing on East and 
Central Asia, and the Six Party Talks process (South and North Korea, the US, China, Japan 
and Russia) which has emerged to try to alleviate and resolve tensions on the Korean 
peninsula.3 Other inter-governmental dialogues have continued to emerge such as the 
‘Trilateral Security Dialogue’ among the US, Japan and Australia.4 
Dialogues have also been pursued on a non-official or semi-official basis. In the broad Asia-
Pacific context, discussions have been sponsored by the Pacific Basin Economic Council 
(PBEC, a forum for business leaders across the Pacific since 1967) and the Pacific Economic 
Council (PECC) which since 1980 has been a tripartite dialogue among business, government 
and academic figures to advance cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.5 Another notable example 
of a forum initiated by a non-governmental body is the ‘Shangri-La Dialogue’ on regional 
security issues, which has been sponsored by the London-based International Institute for 
Strategic Studies and has since 2000 brought together defence ministers and senior officials 
for discussions annually in Singapore.6 
In this pluralist environment, ASEAN has been and continues to be a leading contributor to 
cooperation efforts, both among its own members and with a wide range of partners. 
ASEAN since 1967 
ASEAN was established by a meeting in Bangkok in August 1967 of the foreign ministers of 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand and the Deputy Prime Minister of 
                                                 
2. APEC’s members are: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; 
The Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; USA and Viet Nam.  
3. See the SCO website at http://www.sectsco.org/html/00026.html; on the Six Party Talks see 
Scott Snyder, ‘Six Party Talks: “Action for action” and the formalization of regional security 
cooperation in Northeast Asia’, International Journal for Korean Unification Studies, vol. 16, 
no. 1, 2007, pp. 1–24. 
4.  Tow, op. cit., pp. 19–21. 
5.  On PBEC see http://www.pbec.org/ and for PECC see http://www.pecc.org/ 
6.  For details of the 2008 dialogue (30 May–1 June) see International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, ‘Shangri-La Dialogue Report 2008’ at http://www.iiss.org/publications/shangri-la-
dialogue-report-2008/ 
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Malaysia.7 The founding members of ASEAN had several major motivations when they first 
met. In 1967 the Cold War was at its height—as was the war in Vietnam. Each of the 
founding members was highly concerned about domestic Communist-led revolutionary 
movements and felt acutely vulnerable in relation to the major powers—especially the Soviet 
Union and China. The capacity of the major powers for involvement in internal and inter-
state conflicts was seen as one of the major security threats to the region—as was being 
illustrated so clearly in Indochina.  
In addition, the five founding members had only very recently experienced serious tensions 
between each other—particularly during Indonesia’s ‘Confrontation’ of the new state of 
Malaysia (between 1963 and 1966). In its first year of existence, ASEAN was virtually 
immobilised by the tensions arising over the Philippines’ claim to the Malaysian state of 
Sabah. There was very little trust or confidence among Southeast Asian countries in the late 
1960s.  
Economic development was also a severe worry for all ASEAN members. In 1967 there was 
as yet no ‘East Asian miracle’—but rather a group comprising one city state and four poor, 
primarily agriculture-based economies highly dependent on their primary product trade, with 
what they saw as unsympathetic First World trading partners. In the late 1960s, Singapore 
was just beginning to plan the export-oriented process of industrial development which has 
since been followed by many other countries in Southeast Asia.  
ASEAN was not initially in a position to exercise any significant influence on these 
conditions. What its members did do was to set up a model of regional cooperation that its 
very diverse members could live with and which maximised the members’ diplomatic and 
political strengths. ASEAN’s model of cooperation was developed in several main phases. 
From 1967 until 1975, the pace of activity was very low key and the members concentrated 
on discussion and confidence building. The end of the wars in Indochina in 1975 was 
accompanied by a sense of uncertainty in the region which stimulated a second phase of 
development: ASEAN at its first heads of government summit meeting in Bali (February 
1976) upgraded both regional dialogues and efforts at economic cooperation.  
The ASEAN approach to regional cooperation after 1967 involved several key features: 
• a steady process of contact and confidence building was developed to dampen down the 
considerable bases for conflict among the members. In a style known widely as ‘The 
ASEAN Way’, the Association has emphasised informality and loose arrangements, has 
valued personal relations rather than ambitious institution-building, has stressed the 
primacy of the sovereign equality of members and has generally avoided the exercise of 
                                                 
7.  The section below draws from Frank Frost, ‘ASEAN at 30: Enlargement, Consolidation and the 
Problems of Cambodia’, Current Issues Brief no 2, 1997/98, Department of the Parliamentary 
Library, 25 August 1997. 
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overt leadership, and has sought gradual change based on consensus with cooperation 
proceeding ‘at a pace comfortable to all’8 
• strong emphasis was given to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
member countries: ASEAN’s founding declaration in Bangkok in 1967 called upon 
member states to ‘... ensure their stability and security from external interference in any 
form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the 
ideals and aspirations of their peoples’9 
• in Bali in February 1976 ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). 
The TAC calls for signatories to commit to ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another’, a ‘renunciation of the threat or use of force’ and the settlement of disputes by 
‘peaceful means’.10 The Treaty has been advanced as a key ASEAN document which sets 
out important principles (or ‘norms’ for behaviour) for the conduct of relations in 
Southeast Asia—and which ASEAN invites other states to accede to and endorse, which a 
number have done (including Australia) 
• ASEAN developed a distinctive style of organisation which emphasised frequent meetings 
and discouraged ‘top heavy’ institutions. ASEAN’s key structure was the annual 
Ministerial Meetings, initially of foreign ministers but including economics ministers 
from 1976. After these meetings, ASEAN since 1979 has held the Post Ministerial 
Conference (PMC) which is attended by the foreign ministers of ASEAN’s ‘dialogue 
partners’.11 The Association held its first summit of heads of government in 1976: since 
1997 they have been held annually and became a central focus for ASEAN’s 
cooperation.12 ASEAN has a Secretary General and a small Secretariat but has so far 
avoided developing any large bureaucracy 
• ASEAN endorsed economic cooperation as a major focus for the group, but without 
pursuing programs which would have produced serious disharmony among its very 
                                                 
8.  On the ‘ASEAN Way’ see Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN 
Community, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2006, pp. 1–40, and Jurgen 
Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2003. A 
stimulating sceptical view of ASEAN’s cooperative capacities is provided by David Martin 
Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, ‘Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East 
Asian Regional Order’, International Security, vol. 32, no. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 148–184. 
9.  ‘The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Thailand, 8 August 1967’ at 
http://www.aseansec.org/3628.htm 
10.  ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976’ at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm 
11. ASEAN has ten dialogue partners: Australia, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) also has dialogue status. 
12.  When the new ASEAN Charter is implemented, Summits will be held twice a year. 
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diverse members. ASEAN also contributed to building an image for Southeast Asia as a 
stable and benign destination for foreign investment 
• the members used ASEAN’s collective drawing power to gradually include the major 
external powers in dialogue—a process begun seriously in 1976 at the Bali summit and 
now a central feature of ASEAN 
• the members utilised ASEAN to take a stand on key regional security issues—especially 
the Indochina refugee crisis in 1978–1979, which was a very serious threat to most 
members, and over the conflict in Cambodia after Vietnam’s invasion in December 1978.  
ASEAN was a product of the period of the Cold War in Southeast Asia and it gained its 
greatest influence through its role in the most serious conflict of the Cold War era in the 
region in the last two decades: Cambodia. The ASEAN members viewed Vietnam’s invasion 
as a violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty, and were also committed to support 
Thailand, which as a ‘frontline state’ in relation to Indochina was concerned at the presence 
of over 150 000 Vietnamese forces in Cambodia after 1979. ASEAN encouraged 
international action to deny legitimacy to Vietnam’s actions and cooperated with the major 
powers—particularly China and the United States—to oppose Vietnam’s policies. While the 
conflict over Cambodia continued, ASEAN had a very high profile diplomatically—for 
example, through the resolutions which it sponsored each year in the United Nations General 
Assembly.  
The decline of Cold War confrontation internationally was reflected directly in Southeast 
Asia by Vietnam’s move to withdraw its forces from Cambodia (in September 1989) and by 
resolution of the Cambodia conflict as a regional and international problem (through the Paris 
Agreements of October 1991). After the agreement on Cambodia, the ASEAN members 
faced an improved regional security situation with new prospects for detente between former 
adversaries, particularly China and Vietnam, and Vietnam and the ASEAN states. ASEAN 
members, however, also faced an international climate where many problems competed for 
the attention of the major powers. With the Cambodia issue resolved as an international issue, 
there were concerns that ASEAN might not be able to hold the international interest which its 
members had got used to during the 1980s.  
In the early 1990s the ASEAN members, in the third major phase of the Association’s 
development, moved actively to ‘re-engineer’ the Association—to keep it at the centre of 
regional cooperation in the 1990s and beyond.13 This took several important forms: enhanced 
cooperation on security and economic issues, enlarging the membership, and inaugurating 
new avenues for cooperation on regional security, particularly through the ASEAN Regional 
Forum. 14  
                                                 
13.  M. C. Abad Jr, ‘Re-engineering ASEAN’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 18, no. 3, 
December 1996, pp. 237–253. 
14.  ARF members are Australia, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Canada, China, European 
Union (Presidency), India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, 
6 
ASEAN’s regional cooperation and multilateral relations: recent developments and Australia’s interests 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, ASEAN entered a fourth phase of its evolution when it faced 
some difficult developments and challenges. The Asian financial crisis (from mid-1997) 
seriously damaged the economies of a number of regional states, especially Thailand and 
Indonesia. Although ASEAN had not been structured to be able to deal with such a crisis, the 
image of economic success for the ASEAN region was at least for some time damaged. 
ASEAN’s moves to expand its membership were impeded in July 1997 by serious internal 
political conflict in Cambodia, which resulted in a delay in Cambodia’s membership in the 
Association until 1999. ASEAN’s capacity to be seen to be able to respond to security 
problems in the region was brought into question by the crisis over East Timor in 1999. 
While several ASEAN members took significant parts in the subsequent United Nations—
endorsed efforts to stabilise the situation, ASEAN itself did not pursue an active role. 
ASEAN’s capacity to influence developments in its region was also challenged by the 
emergence of major environmental problems arising from annual patterns of burning of forest 
and agricultural areas particularly in Indonesia, producing a ‘haze’ which affected several 
regional states.15 
While these developments were affecting ASEAN overall, some individual members were 
also experiencing substantial internal pressures and change. In the wake of the financial 
crisis, the government in Thailand of Prime Minister Chaovalit Yongchaiyudt fell in 
November 1997. In Indonesia the long-established government led by President Suharto, an 
ASEAN ‘elder statesman’, came to an end in May 1998, to be replaced by a less orderly but 
more democratic system of political competition.16 In this environment of regional and 
national change, there were also significant debates about the ‘ASEAN Way’ and whether 
some norms—particularly in relation to the ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ principle—
might need to be revised when internal developments in one state (such as political disorder 
or burning of forest areas) could clearly affect the interests of neighbours.  
Several regional figures, notably Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan and Malaysia’s 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, suggested that it might now be appropriate for 
ASEAN members to take more concerted interest in the affairs of their neighbours. This 
approach might involve public comment on particular issues or policies in relation to 
individual ASEAN states which might be of concern to fellow members of the Association. 
Foreign Minister Surin termed this possible approach ‘flexible engagement’. These 
suggestions for revising the basics of the ‘ASEAN Way’, however, were resisted by other 
members who feared that they might disrupt the pattern of quiet diplomacy which had been 
central to ASEAN’s success so far and ASEAN did not adopt the proposed concept.17 
                                                                                                                                                        
Pakistan, PNG, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, USA and Vietnam. 
15.  Sheldon W. Simon, ASEAN and its Security Offspring: Facing New Challenges, Strategic 
Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, October 2007, pp. 1–3. 
16.  Haacke, op. cit., pp. 165–157. 
17.  Anwar Ibrahim’s arrest in September 1998 (on charges of alleged corruption and sexual 
malpractice) also removed from the scene one of the principle advocates, in this period, of 
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Nonetheless, these debates had raised important issues about ASEAN’s style of cooperation, 
issues which have continued to be relevant as ASEAN has struggled with the challenges of 
deepening economic integration and developing a Charter for the Association (as this paper 
points out below).  
The developments in the latter half of the 1990s added to the pressures and stimuli for 
ASEAN’s leaders to try to reaffirm the Association’s relevance and sense of direction. In the 
early 21st century, ASEAN is continuing its efforts towards self-renewal, both among its 
members and with the wider region. 
Pursuing the ‘ASEAN Community’ 
Since the late 1990s, the ASEAN members have pursued efforts to renew their commitment 
to cooperation, stimulated by factors including the adverse impact of the Asian financial 
crisis on many members from mid 1997 and the need to cooperate and compete effectively 
with the rapidly rising economic power of China and also of India, whose large markets and 
low-cost labour have been highly attractive to foreign investors.  
These efforts led to a major declaration at the ninth ASEAN summit meeting of heads of 
government, in Bali in 2003, which has become known as the ‘Bali Concord II’ (a reference 
back to ASEAN’s first meeting of heads of government, in Bali in 1976). The adoption of the 
Bali Concord II can be seen as ushering in the fifth and latest phase in the Association’s 
development. In this Concord, ASEAN declared that, ‘For the sustainability of our region’s 
economic development we affirmed the need for a secure political environment based on a 
strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation’. To pursue 
ASEAN’s goals, the members declared that: 
An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and 
security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and 
shared prosperity in the region.18 
The Bali Concord II declaration also reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to enhance 
‘economic linkages with the world economy’, ASEAN competitiveness and a favourable 
investment environment, and adherence to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a 
functioning and effective code of conduct for the region.19 ASEAN has since made some 
significant efforts to try to follow up these commitments. 
                                                                                                                                                        
changes to ‘the ASEAN Way’. For a detailed discussion about the debate over ‘flexible 
engagement’ see Haacke, op. cit., pp. 165–190. 
18.  ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) Bali, 7 October 2003’, at 
http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm 
19.  Etel Solingen, ‘ASEAN Cooperation: ‘The Legacy of the Economic Crisis’, International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, p. 20.  
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The ‘ASEAN Economic Community’ 
Economic cooperation was a declared goal of ASEAN from its inception, but it has never 
been easy to pursue. The ASEAN economies have tended to be competitive rather than 
complementary in character with a heavy orientation towards markets outside the region, 
(especially in Japan, the US and Europe). As a result, early attempts to develop cooperative 
projects, which following the fashion of the day, often took the form of industrial planning, 
were largely symbolic in nature. However from the early 1990s more serious efforts towards 
cooperation developed.  
In 1992 agreement was reached to pursue the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which 
sought to remove barriers to trade and investment and thus increase the grouping’s 
attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment. Some progress was achieved through 
AFTA in reducing trade barriers, but it did not have the desired results of liberalising trade 
comprehensively. A major reason for this was that most ASEAN members had pursued 
significant unilateral reductions in their tariffs in the 1980s and 1990s and the extra margin of 
benefit which might be offered by utilising AFTA was often quite limited for many traders. 
As a result, only a small proportion of intra-ASEAN traders took advantage of the lower tariff 
levels offered by AFTA (usually only about 5 per cent of overall trade). AFTA also had 
relatively little impact on other important obstacles to trade flows, including non-tariff 
barriers and restrictions on services trade.20  
In the early 21st century it was evident that these efforts had had a limited impact and were 
not adequate to meet ASEAN’s needs. ASEAN’s then Secretary General Rodolfo Severino 
commented in 2002 that: 
The process of integration has generally stalled. To be sure, some progress has been made, 
notably in AFTA, but progress has fallen short of measuring up to the challenges faced by 
our region and carrying out the leaders’ vision and resolve. AFTA has seen little actual use 
by traders. The other foundations for regional integration have not been built upon. Regional 
economic integration seems to have become stuck in framework agreements, work 
programmes, and master plans. 21 
The continuing pressures for ASEAN to achieve more thorough liberalisation and 
cooperation were summarised by a report on ASEAN issued in July 2006 by the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 
                                                 
20.  John Ravenhill, ‘Fighting irrelevance: An economic community “with ASEAN characteristics”, 
Working Paper 2007/3, Department of International Relations, Australian national University, 
July 2007, pp. 3–7. See also John Ravenhill, ‘Fighting Irrelevance: An economic community 
“with ASEAN characteristics”’, Pacific Review, vol. 21, no. 4, December 2008, pp. 49–488. 
21.  Rodolfo Severino quoted in Ravenhill, ‘Fighting irrelevance: An economic community “with 
ASEAN characteristics”’, Working Paper, op. cit., p. 11. 
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Despite solid growth recorded since the Asian financial crisis in the late nineties, ASEAN’s 
growth rate has not matched those of its giant regional neighbours China and India over this 
period. Nor have ASEAN’s merchandise exports grown as rapidly as China’s or India’s ….  
Both China and India present as single markets and production bases with national laws and 
regulations which, at least in principle, apply throughout the country. ASEAN, by contrast, 
is still an association of ten diverse economies separated by different tariff regimes, customs 
procedures, product standards and other non-tariff measures. The market is also fragmented 
by different regulations in the services sector and for investment; other behind-the-border 
barriers such as the anti-competitive practices of domestic firms; different legal systems and 
industrial structures; and inadequate connections between national infrastructures.22 
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) aims to create a ‘seamless production base’ and 
an integrated market among the members. ASEAN’s goals include the elimination of the 
remaining intra-ASEAN tariffs and the large number of non-tariff barriers, creating an 
effective intellectual property regime, fully liberalising trade in services, and relaxing barriers 
to flows of capital and skilled labour in all sectors. If achieved, the AEC could be expected to 
increase production efficiency, attract more investment and generate more exports. By one 
estimate, the AEC could boost the ASEAN region’s GDP by 10 per cent and reduce operating 
costs by 25 per cent.23  
However, ASEAN faces many challenges in pursuing the AEC. ASEAN’s members include 
economies at widely varying levels of development (eg the difference between Singapore, 
and Laos and Myanmar) and the members have not yet been prepared to have either a 
harmonised internal tariff regime or a common external tariff policy. One key issue here is 
how ASEAN can achieve a common external tariff. Singapore already has a zero tariff policy 
and would not be willing to agree to a common ASEAN tariff level that was above zero. 
However some of the less developed ASEAN economies depend on revenue from tariffs and 
would face fiscal problems from a zero level.24  
A second major issue is that while progress has been made in reducing tariff levels, non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) also pose major obstacles to trade. Non-tariff barriers can range from cross-
border barriers such as cumbersome customs procedures to internal technical barriers that can 
arise from differences in health and safety provisions, and product quality and 
testing/certification procedures. One recent assessment argued that, ‘The protective and 
taxing effect of NTBs is substantially higher than that of formal tariffs that apply to trade. 
NTBs raise the price of products in the region, making exports less competitive, and 
undermining the impact of tariff reductions.25 ASEAN policy-makers are well aware of the 
                                                 
22.  Gita Nandan, ASEAN: Building an Economic Community, Canberra, Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, July 2006, p. v. 
23.  ‘Asean to focus on trade, integration’, Oxford Analytica, 30 December 2005. 
24.  Ravenhill, ‘Fighting irrelevance: An economic community “with ASEAN characteristics”’, 
Working Paper 2007/3, op. cit., p. 13. 
25.  ‘ASEAN: Non-tariff barriers threaten integration hopes’, Oxford Analytica, 12 August 2008. 
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problems posed by NTBs and have focused on priority sectors, adopted relevant WTO 
guidelines and accelerated implementation of ‘mutual recognition mechanisms’ for key areas, 
including nursing, architecture and engineering. Progress is nonetheless considered to have 
been slow and ASEAN has fallen behind its own schedule. It also remains to be seen whether 
ASEAN can strengthen its institutions to provide for security and certainty in implementing 
agreements and to provide effective mechanisms for dispute resolution. Although ASEAN 
does have a Dispute Resolution Mechanism whose powers were enhanced in 2003, the 
mechanism in practice has not been used because of the prevailing ASEAN ethos of 
maintaining consensus in discussions and decision making.26 The new ASEAN Charter 
endorses the importance of dispute settlement mechanisms and the Association is currently 
studying how more effective arrangements may be developed.27 
John Ravenhill (Australian National University) has argued (in mid 2007) that, ‘… an 
enormous distance has still to be travelled before ASEAN has a set of agreements that are 
sufficiently specific that they could conceivably be legally enforceable. It is this lack of 
specificity in ASEAN agreements, coupled with the failure of member states to see their 
provisions as binding obligations, which are the principal problems’.28 In this context, a 
major question is whether the new ASEAN Charter can begin to add some of the greater 
institutional strength that ASEAN needs. 
While they are pursuing market integration among themselves, the ASEAN members are also 
pursuing a range of trade agreements to enhance their relations with major trading partners 
including China, Japan, South Korea, India, the US and Australia and New Zealand.29 The 
numbers and range of trade agreements being pursued involve some potential challenges for 
ASEAN. Trade with major partners has been growing rapidly under the existing WTO 
framework and without specific bilateral or regional multilateral agreements, and it is not 
always clear that such agreements make a major net addition to trade opportunities. Given 
that there is no common framework for the development of FTAs, ASEAN could face some 
complex issues of harmonisation of agreements in the future. The agreements are a further 
pressure for change and liberalisation of trade arrangements in the ASEAN region, but some 
concern has been expressed by analysts as to whether the range of external trade 
                                                 
26.  ibid; Loreli C. de Dios, ‘Non-tariff Barriers in Trade in the ASEAN Priority Goods Sectors, in 
Denis Hew Ed, Brick by Brick: the Building of an ASEAN Economic Community, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2007, pp. 86–115.  
27.  The ASEAN Charter, Singapore, November 2007, p. 23, at http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-
Charter.pdf 
28.  Ravenhill, ‘Fighting irrelevance: An economic community “with ASEAN characteristics”’, 
Working Paper 2007/3, op. cit., p. 17. 
29.  ‘ASEAN: ministers confirm commitment to integration’, Oxford Analytica, 3 August 2006. 
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arrangements being pursued is in fact distracting the attention and limited resources of the 
ASEAN states away from their efforts at internal market integration. 30 
There appears to be a determination in ASEAN to carry the AEC process forward. In January 
2007 the ASEAN heads of government agreed to advance the schedule for implementation of 
the AEC from 2020 to 2015.31 ASEAN’s capacity to secure the ambitious economic goals it 
has set out will clearly be a major test of its coherence and viability. 
The ‘ASEAN Political-Security Community’ 
In parallel with its pursuit of economic integration, ASEAN since the late 1990s has been 
seeking to bolster its own role and sense of direction to advance regional security. The 
ASEAN members have continued to face some difficult security issues, including ongoing 
inter-state disputes, the problems created by the intransigent and dictatorial regime in 
Myanmar (which has had a substantial impact on Thailand, including the presence of several 
hundred thousand refugees) and the challenges posed by Islamic-based separatist movements 
and terrorism. To reaffirm its role as a force for stability and security in Southeast Asia, 
ASEAN decided in 2003 to develop the concept of an ‘ASEAN Security Community’ (which 
has been referred to since 2007 as the ‘ASEAN Political-Security Community’, APSC).32 
The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) concept was initiated by Indonesia and adopted as 
part of the ‘Bali Concord II’ in October 2003. The ASC was meant to be an evolutionary 
concept rather than one which seeks a sharp change or departure in ASEAN practices. 
ASEAN’s central purpose from its outset was to help the members achieve a secure 
environment to enhance prospects for internal stability and economic progress. The many 
years of meetings and discussions have been designed to a major degree to build up 
communication and increase trust. It can be argued, then, that fostering a sense of regional 
security has always been at the centre of ASEAN’s concerns and that the Political-Security 
Community is an extension of this role. ASEAN has issued some guidelines for its aims for 
this Community but a detailed ‘blueprint’ has not yet been finalised: this is expected to be 
endorsed at the next Summit in Bangkok in December 2008. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, much of ASEAN’s focus on security was directed towards 
challenges from outside the member countries: the implications of the end of the wars in 
Indochina, the movement of large numbers of refugees and the dispute over Cambodia. Since 
the 1990s, it has become increasingly apparent that there are a number of existing and 
                                                 
30. ‘ASEAN: regional powers pursue free trade deals’, Oxford Analytica, 14 June 2006; ‘Asia: 
FTAs will multiply but need better design’, Oxford Analytica, 6 August 2008. 
31.  Eileen Ng, ‘ASEAN unveils plans for its 2015 single market, says political constraints not a 
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potential security challenges within the ASEAN region which are transnational in character 
and which demand more cooperation among the members to address. 
The APSC initiative aims to use ASEAN’s own mechanisms to resolve disputes among 
members and to pursue much closer cooperation on transnational security challenges 
including terrorism, narcotics, people trafficking, and maritime security issues. The APSC 
also reflects long-term emphases in ASEAN by ruling out an ASEAN defence pact, military 
alliance or joint foreign policy.33  
It is not yet clear how ASEAN will move to follow through its initial declarations on the 
APSC: the forthcoming ‘blueprint’ may clarify this. There has been some further 
development in the ASEAN region of an increased sense of political community since the 
devastating impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004. The assistance given by 
ASEAN states to their fellow members was appreciated: for example, the role of Singaporean 
medical teams in Aceh was valued highly by Indonesia.34 There have also been proposals for 
areas in which ASEAN could develop further relevant cooperation, for example in improving 
capacities for disaster management. ASEAN’s role in coordinating responses to the aftermath 
of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar from May 2008 has been another important development in 
this area (see below). 
A further reflection of ASEAN interest in security dialogue was the holding of the first 
meeting of ASEAN defence ministers in May 2006. ASEAN defence ministers and service 
chiefs have been meeting on a bilateral basis for many years and defence officials also take 
part in ARF inter-sessional meetings, but it was thought appropriate that the defence 
ministers should now meet formally on a multilateral basis.35 The need for greater capacities 
to coordinate disaster relief was a key theme in the meeting, which also focussed on other 
issues of common concern including terrorism, piracy and people trafficking. The defence 
ministers declared their commitment to achieving an ASEAN Security Community by 2020, 
which they envisaged would include agreements on extradition treaties, counter-terrorism 
arrangements and on a joint ASEAN peacekeeping force.36  
At their second meeting held in Singapore on 14 November 2007, the defence ministers 
endorsed plans for further cooperation in areas including terrorism, maritime security and 
infectious diseases. The ministers also adopted a proposal to expand their discussions to 
include other ASEAN dialogue partners’ defence ministers in a process termed ‘ASEAN 
                                                 
33.  International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2003/04, Oxford University Press, 
London, 2004, pp. 262–265. 
34.  Michael Vatikiotis, ‘Southeast Asia in 2005: Strength in the face of adversity’, Southeast Asian 
Affairs 2006, p. 5. 
35.  Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community, op. cit., pp. 364–365. 
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Defence Ministers Meetings-Plus’ (ADMM-Plus’). Singapore’s Defence Minister Teo Chee 
Hean said in an address to the meeting that. ‘ASEAN’s future is increasingly intertwined with 
the fate of the larger Asia Pacific region. The ASEAN Defence Ministers meeting should 
look at tapping the varied perspectives, expertise and resources of other ASEAN friends and 
dialogue partners such as the US, China, India, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Korea’.37 
The ADMM-Plus concept is expected to be developed in more detail.38 
The ASEAN members have continued to pursue multiple strategies towards advancing 
security in the region. Individual members have cooperated on a bilateral and multilateral 
basis with both regional and external partners to gain improved cooperation across borders 
and to increase interaction in a number of areas of counter-terrorism activities. ASEAN 
adopted a Declaration of Joint Action to Counter-Terrorism at its summit in December 2001 
and at its Cebu summit in January 2007, endorsed the ASEAN Convention on Counter-
Terrorism. While valuable cooperation continues, a recent Australian study has suggested 
that more could be done by ASEAN members to explicitly underscore their commitment in 
this area by acceding to and ratifying international conventions and protocols to combat 
terrorism.39 Cooperation has increased in useful ways in maritime security: since 2004 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have conducted coordinated naval patrols and joint air 
surveillance operations to increase security in the Malacca Strait. All of these activities 
clearly contribute to a more secure ASEAN region.40 
However, the ASEAN states face some ongoing obstacles towards the development of the 
climate of trust and confidence which can support a ‘political-security community’. Two 
states, Thailand and the Philippines, have serious ongoing internal conflicts involving Islamic 
movements, and the Philippines faces the last significant communist resistance movement in 
Southeast Asia. While no outright armed conflict has ever occurred between ASEAN 
members, tensions have certainly been evident in some inter-state relationships. In recent 
years there has been discord between Thailand and Malaysia (over alleged support from 
across the Thai-Malaysia border for insurgency in southern Thailand), Singapore and 
Malaysia (for example, over a disputed island, recently awarded to Singapore), and Singapore 
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and Thailand (over the purchase by a Singapore state-owned corporation from then Thai 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of his family telecommunications company).41 
Another high profile focus for intra-ASEAN dispute has been relations between Thailand and 
Cambodia. Bilateral relations were disrupted severely in late January 2003 by rioting and 
violence in Phnom Penh after alleged comments by a Thai actress about the status of the 
Angkor Wat temples (which she supposedly said should belong to Thailand) inflamed 
Cambodian sentiments. Demonstrations in Phnom Penh severely damaged the Thai embassy 
and other Thai-owned businesses.42 In June 2008, additional discord arose over the status of 
areas of land near the temple of Preah Vihear. The ancient temple, on the border between the 
two countries, had been awarded to Cambodia in a decision of the International Court in 
1962, but its status has continued to be a matter of some sensitivity and controversy. When 
Cambodia proceeded to submit the temple for listing as a World Heritage Site, renewed 
tensions developed, including the presence of hundreds of troops from both sides near the 
temple area. An offer by the ASEAN foreign ministers at mediation (made during their 
annual meetings in Singapore in late July) was rejected by Thailand. Tensions appeared to 
ease in mid-August after Cambodia’s national elections had been held but were still evident 
in mid-September.43 The dispute nonetheless illustrated that nationalism and historical 
grievances can easily pose challenges to the spirit of regional accord which ASEAN seeks in 
the ASEAN Political-Security Community.44  
ASEAN also faces a further substantial obstacle to the development of political and security 
cohesion from the character and policies of the regime in Myanmar (see below). 
The ‘ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community’ 
The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) is intended to be the third pillar of 
ASEAN’s goal of achieving a more integrated ‘ASEAN Community’. The socio-cultural 
community proposal is a reflection of views in ASEAN that the pursuit of closer cooperation 
in the economic and security areas should also be accompanied by increased emphasis on 
developing a shared sense of identity among the member countries and peoples. Rodolfo 
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Severino, a former Secretary General, has argued that Southeast Asia cannot be an enduring 
security and economic community without being a socio-cultural community.45 
ASEAN has set out the goals for the ASCC in a ‘plan of action’—an overall and more 
detailed ‘blueprint’ is currently being drawn up. The plan of action states that: 
The ASCC reflects ASEAN’s social agenda that is focused on poverty eradication and 
human development. It is linked inextricably with the economic and security pillars of the 
ASEAN Community. Social inequities can threaten economic development and in turn 
undermine political regimes. Economic instability can exacerbate poverty, unemployment, 
hunger, illness and disease. Social instability can emerge from environmental scarcity or the 
inequitable distribution among stakeholders of the use of environmental assets. Failure to 
address these critical and persistent social issues can further cause both economic and 
political dislocations. 46 
ASEAN members differ widely in their level of socio-cultural characteristics and economic 
development. In education for example, overall literacy rates vary from 67.7 to 95.1 per cent. 
There are wide gaps in conditions between the six ‘older’ members and the four newer 
members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). The ASEAN Baseline Report (2006) 
reported that ASEAN members had poverty rates ranging from 5 to 35 per cent. Health 
standards also understandably vary, with life expectancy at between 59 and 79 years.47  
Individual ASEAN countries have made some major gains in standards and conditions in 
recent years. Between 1993 and 2002 the proportion of people living on an income of less 
than $US 1 dollar per day declined in Indonesia from 17.4 per cent to 7.5 per cent and in 
Vietnam the proportion dropped from 14.6 per cent to 2.2 per cent. The proportion of 
children attending primary school in Cambodia rose from 69.3 per cent in 1991 to 97.6 per 
cent in 2004 and in Laos in the same period rose from 67.4 to 81.7 per cent.48 Analysts see 
many areas in which cooperation can improve standards and conditions in socio-cultural 
sectors including labour mobility and the rights of migrant workers, social safety nets, 
sustainable development and health.  
Progress towards socio-cultural community goals, however, will continue to be affected by 
ASEAN’s style of consensus-based decision-making and the challenge of translating declared 
objectives into concrete policies. This ongoing challenge has been illustrated in the area of 
forest destruction and the regional ‘haze’ problem. In the decade since the haze issue 
attracted major attention ASEAN has addressed the matter through a number of agreements, 
especially the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. While important 
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dialogue and studies have been pursued, the impact of the agreement has been limited by the 
refusal so far of Indonesia to ratify it because the agreement is seen as likely to damage the 
country’s economic interests.49 Reports in August 2008 suggested that the haze issue was 
likely to continue to be a problem for neighbouring states, particularly Singapore and 
Malaysia.50 The haze issue both underscores the relevance of the goals of the ASCC and also 
the challenges facing ASEAN states in implementing them. 
ASEAN and Myanmar  
The situation in Myanmar is one of ASEAN’s most serious problems. The military regime in 
Myanmar rejected the outcome of elections held in 1990 (won by the National League for 
Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi) and has detained her for long periods since.51 When 
Myanmar was accepted as an ASEAN member in 1997 there were hopes within the 
association that there would be a gradual process of liberalisation within the country. 
However the regime has remained intransigent on the issue of political reform and its stance 
has caused problems for ASEAN in relations with major external partners including the 
European Union and the US.52  
Concern within a number of ASEAN members about Myanmar increased after the re-arrest 
of Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2003. The subsequent behaviour of the Myanmar regime has 
not eased these concerns. The secretive and isolationist nature of the regime was highlighted 
by the announcement in November 2005 of the decision to move the country’s capital from 
Yangon to the new inland city of Naypyidaw: Myanmar’s ASEAN partners had not been 
informed in advance about the move.53 In 2005 ASEAN faced the potentially embarrassing 
prospect that Myanmar would in July 2006 assume the position of Chair of ASEAN for the 
next year (under ASEAN’s system of rotating the chair annually on an alphabetical basis). 
Many members feared that the group would face both a loss of international credibility and 
difficulties in relations with some of its major dialogue partners. The problem was avoided 
when Myanmar relinquished its right to the position in July 2005. In December 2005, 
Malaysia (the Chair of ASEAN in 2005–2006) indicated that ASEAN might no longer be 
able to defend Myanmar diplomatically, and strongly criticised the lack of political reform.54  
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The problems posed for ASEAN by Myanmar have increased in 2007 and 2008. In 
September 2007 a series of demonstrations against the government was led by Buddhist 
monks. In the days after 17 September, protests by monks and by supporters of the National 
League for 7 Democracy were repressed violently by the regime: at least 31 people were 
killed and thousands arrested.55 The ASEAN foreign ministers, in an informal meeting on 27 
September 2007 at the United Nations in New York, made an unusually strong statement in 
response. The Ministers said they ‘were appalled to hear reports of automatic weapons being 
used and demanded that the Myanmar Government immediately desist from the use of 
violence against demonstrators. They ‘expressed their revulsion’ about the use of violence 
against demonstrators, urged restraint, called on Myanmar to resume efforts at national 
reconciliation and ‘called for the release of all political detainees including Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi.56 However, ASEAN did not have a consensus to attempt to take any further 
institutional steps in relation to Myanmar, such as suspending membership. When ASEAN 
held its annual Summit in Singapore in November 2007, Myanmar took part as usual. During 
the meetings, Myanmar was able to veto a proposal made by the host country Singapore that 
the UN’s Special Envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, should address a working dinner on 
Myanmar. After objections from Myanmar, Gambari was told to stay away, a development 
seen as embarrassing to Singapore.57 
Myanmar, ASEAN and Cyclone Nargis 
The character of the regime in Myanmar was again highlighted by the onset of Cyclone 
Nargis which devastated wide areas of the Irrawaddy delta from 3 May 2008. The cyclone 
resulted in major loss of lives (estimated by the government at over 130 000), but the regime 
initially restricted communication about the situation and rejected many offers of assistance 
from foreign governments and NGOs. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, however, the 
regime did go ahead with a planned referendum on 10 May on its proposals for a return to 
elected government—the regime claimed that the referendum was endorsed by 92.5 per cent 
of voters, but the government had made it illegal to campaign for a ‘no’ vote.58 
The restrictive and limited response of the Myanmar regime to the cyclone—which included 
refusing access to foreign media and refusing to accept aid from US and other naval vessels 
stationed near the coast of the country—produced substantial international criticism. This 
environment created a need and an opportunity for ASEAN to act. ASEAN governments 
were able to persuade the regime to allow the deployment (from 9–18 May 2008) of an 
Emergency Rapid Assessment Team to many, though not all, of the affected areas in 
Myanmar. The regime also agreed to give relief teams from individual ASEAN countries 
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direct access to many areas, while accepting money and supplies, but not people, from non-
ASEAN states. ASEAN’s Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan, visited Yangon on 20–21 May 
2008 and gained increased cooperation from the government. 59 
On 25 May 2008, ASEAN organised a donors’ conference that secured additional support 
from the international community and the Myanmar Government also allowed increased 
access for ASEAN relief workers to the country. The ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for 
the Victims of Cyclone Nargis was established, headed by Dr Pitsuwan, to mediate 
cooperation between the Myanmar Government and the international community, including 
the United Nations.60 This cooperation enabled preparation of the ‘Post Nargis Joint 
Assessment Report’, released in Singapore on 21 July during the ASEAN ministerial 
meetings, which provided a detailed assessment of recovery efforts and further needs for 
assistance. An ASEAN media release about the Joint Report stated that: 
This is the first time that ASEAN has played such a leading role in responding to a natural 
disaster affecting one of its Member States. ASEAN facilitated and coordinated 
international assistance to the survivors of the cyclone as well as the conduct of this 
assessment. At their special meeting on 19 May … Secretary-General of ASEAN Dr Surin 
Pitsuwan said, “By linking hands with the UN, the international NGOs, and the rest of the 
world, ASEAN has shown how international humanitarian cooperation can work to help 
bring relief and assistance to the victims of Cyclone Nargis. At the same time, ASEAN is 
putting into action its pledge to build a caring and sharing community”.61 
While ASEAN had been able to play a useful role in alleviating the impasse over aid access 
to Myanmar, the political situation in the country remained unchanged. During ASEAN’s 
ministerial meetings in July 2008 in Singapore, Myanmar was again a central focus for 
attention. While Myanmar announced during the meetings that it had ratified the ASEAN 
Charter, it was also indicated that Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest would continue at least 
until 2009. At the ministerial meetings, the ASEAN foreign ministers again criticised aspects 
of the situation in the country. The ASEAN joint communiqué noted recent developments in 
Myanmar’s ‘peaceful transition to democracy’, but the ministers urged Myanmar to take 
‘bolder steps’ and the document also called for the release of all political detainees, including 
Aung San Suu Kyi, in order to ‘pave the way for meaningful dialogue involving all parties 
concerned’.62  
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ASEAN clearly faces major ongoing problems in relation to Myanmar. While ASEAN 
ministers have protested about conditions in the country, the group’s capacity to respond is 
affected by internal divisions of approach. Members with democratic political systems 
(particularly Indonesia and the Philippines) favour taking a tough stand towards the Myanmar 
regime, but others (including the newer members Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam and some 
members with substantial economic interests in the country, such as Thailand) do not support 
assertive policies towards the regime.63  
The Myanmar regime, moreover, while resisting ASEAN’s efforts at engagement and 
dialogue, has moved to deepen its relations with both China and India; relations which 
effectively bolster the regime’s capacity to reject ASEAN’s attempted influence. China has 
developed a substantial relationship which includes projects for major oil and gas pipelines 
from Myanmar to southern China that will enable China to reduce its dependence on shipping 
routes through Southeast and East Asia. India has also maintained close associations and has 
gained benefit from cooperation with the government to restrict operations of anti-Indian 
insurgent forces operating from Myanmar.64 ASEAN, as a result, has been left with relatively 
little leverage or capacity to deal with a member which refuses to ‘play the ASEAN game’ of 
dialogue and compromise.65 For the present, the situation in Myanmar continues as a major 
obstacle in the way of progress towards the common accord which would support an ASEAN 
Political-Security Community, and as a problem for ASEAN’s international image overall. 
The ASEAN Charter 
For four decades after 1967, ASEAN developed with minimal institutions, a small central 
secretariat, and a consensus that cooperation programs should be essentially voluntary and 
with only limited mechanisms for compliance. In this period ASEAN members entered into a 
number of agreements which are intended to be binding on its members. The Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation sets out the principles which should govern relations among states in 
Southeast Asia (and those external states acceding to it). ASEAN members have also made 
commitments on the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons under the Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone Treaty. The agreement on AFTA involved commitments to liberalise 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. Other agreements have covered areas including services trade, 
intellectual property rights, and harmonisation of product standards, promotion of tourism, 
and air cargo transfers. While some of these agreements have resulted in adherence to the 
goals set out (for example in the area of nuclear weapons), the agreements were not legally 
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binding and ASEAN did not have a central authority which could monitor compliance or call 
on members to account for non-adherence.66 
In a speech in June 2006, ASEAN’s immediate-past Secretary General Ong Keng Yong, 
discussed ASEAN’s customary approaches to cooperation in the following terms: 
When all the 10 Member Governments come together to discuss any regional cooperation, 
what usually results is not something that is most desirable—but more often than not, 
ASEAN goes for something that is least objectionable ... 
One growing internal challenge undermining ASEAN’s credibility is the lack of compliance 
and timely implementation of ASEAN agreements. Many ASEAN agreements were signed 
but not fully ratified in good time. Even when they are in effect, compliance is not always 
readily forthcoming. Consequently there is no certainty of implementation; deadlines are 
often missed or postponed. And worse still, the culprits are never punished. For in ASEAN 
we rely on voluntarism, trust, camaraderie, and face-saving; but no sanctions and no costs to 
the laggards. 
The problem of non-compliance could also be attributed to ASEAN’s lack of legal 
personality. It is unclear what is the legal status of ASEAN agreements within the national 
law of each Member Country. What is clear is that violation of ASEAN agreements seldom 
pains the guilty party. But it certainly hurts ASEAN as a whole.67 
There has been a widespread awareness within ASEAN that this mode of cooperation would 
not be sufficient to enable the group to pursue the ambitious programs for economic 
integration now underway. To attempt to address this issue, ASEAN has developed the 
‘ASEAN Charter’ which was adopted at the ASEAN leaders’ summit in Singapore in 
November 2007. The Charter is one of the most important recent developments in ASEAN, 
but is has also been the subject of debate and controversy. 
The idea for a Charter was suggested initially by Malaysia. A Malaysian concept paper 
argued that if ASEAN were to transform into an ‘ASEAN Community’, its institutional 
framework would have to change profoundly. This suggestion was taken up by the eleventh 
ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 and an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was 
established and asked to provide the ASEAN leaders with ‘bold and visionary’ advice and 
recommendations. Prime Minister Badawi of Malaysia, the Chair of the 2005 summit, said 
that ASEAN needed to be ‘transformed’ to become a more people-centred community.68 
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The Eminent Persons Group consulted widely, including with non-governmental 
organisations and civil society organisations (CSOs). The EPG invited 120 participants from 
CSOs in the region to meetings in Kuala Lumpur and the first ASEAN Civil Society 
Conference took place there from 7–9 December 2005. The Conference issued a statement to 
the ASEAN leaders at the 11th summit which put forward a number of issues for ASEAN to 
consider including civil society participation in ASEAN decision-making, developing 
channels for civil society inputs to the ASEAN Secretariat, establishment of an ASEAN 
Human Rights Commission and a regional mechanism for the protection of the rights of 
women, children and migrant workers.69 
The Eminent Persons Group’s report was issued in January 2007 and distributed widely. The 
report aroused considerable interest and expectations for change in ASEAN. As well as 
calling for the streamlining of ASEAN’s declared principles into a coherent framework, the 
report went further by calling for ‘the active strengthening of democratic values, good 
governance, [and] the rejection of unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government, 
through the respect and institutionalization of the rule of law, including humanitarian law’. 
The report also suggested the potential need for sanctions in relation to members 
transgressing ASEAN values. The EPG report proposed that ‘ASEAN should have the power 
to redress cases of serious breach of ASEAN’s objectives, [and] major principles… [and] 
such measures may include suspension of any of the rights and privileges of membership’.70 
These proposals from the EPG were clearly a significant departure from the previous ASEAN 
ethos of caution, avoidance of controversy and, in particular, strong emphasis on the ‘non-
interference’ principle. Mely Caballero-Anthony (Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 
Singapore) has argued that, ‘[i]n brief, the EPG’s Report therefore raised high expectations of 
an emerging sea change in the thinking among ASEAN elites’.71 The report was also very 
challenging for ASEAN overall, given the extent of political diversity among the countries 
(from democratic pluralist systems in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, to countries 
without openly contested elections for representative institutions, including Brunei, Laos, 
Vietnam and Myanmar).  
It soon became evident that ASEAN was unlikely to take a radical departure in pursuing a 
Charter. While there have been strong pressures for ASEAN to develop a ‘rules-based’ 
foundation for its activities, the diversity of its membership and the sensitivities of members 
towards encroachments on national sovereignty produced counter-pressures towards 
voluntarism and informal cooperation. In discussing the forthcoming Charter, the Philippines 
Foreign Minister Alberto Romulo commented in late July 2007 that, ‘We’re not going to 
have any phraseology that will lead to the disintegration of the region… ASEAN will be 
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more like the United Nations, an intergovernmental body… No one will agree to a 
supranational body’.72 
The Charter endorsed in Singapore on 20 November 2007 was a more modest document than 
the EPG and many observers had hoped. Nonetheless, it has introduced some substantial 
changes and adaptations to ASEAN.73 The Charter gives ASEAN for the first time a legal 
personality as an inter-governmental organisation. ASEAN will have status under 
international law and can make agreements in its own right. The Charter affirms the status of 
the Secretary General as being at ministerial level, with roles including participation in 
ASEAN Summits and other meetings and submitting an annual report to the Summit on 
ASEAN activities. Basic principles for ASEAN’s operation are set out, including provision 
for acceptance of new members.74 The Charter also establishes and outlines the institutional 
structure of ASEAN and has adapted this. The Charter has introduced some significant 
changes, including: 
• convening of the ASEAN Summit twice a year (instead of annually as before) 
• establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Council to be served by the ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers 
• establishing two new positions of Deputy Secretary General, to be recruited openly on 
merit 
• appointment of each member state’s Permanent Representative to ASEAN to form a 
Committee of Permanent Representation 
• single Chairmanship for key high-level ASEAN bodies, and 
• establishment of an ASEAN Human Rights Body.75 
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The Charter has made ASEAN a more rules-based organisation, although the extent to which 
this has been done is a matter of debate. In relation to the important area of compliance with 
ASEAN agreements, the Charter does not authorise the Secretary General or the Secretariat 
to enforce adherence, but calls for cases of non-compliance to be referred to the ASEAN 
Summit. Given that the Summits have operated on the basis of consensus and agreement, it is 
not clear how far this will advance ASEAN’s capacity to achieve adherence to agreements. In 
the area of resolution of disputes, the Charter states that economic matters can be referred to 
the 2004 ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Resolution Mechanism. For other potential 
disputes (for example over security issues) the Charter says that the ‘ASEAN Chair and the 
Secretary General can be requested to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation in a 
dispute’. This provision, however, involves only an intermediary role for the Chair and the 
Secretary General. Disputes would need to be referred to the Summit, where the emphasis on 
consensus is likely to make any assertive or active ASEAN dispute-resolving role difficult to 
achieve, as has been the case in relation to Myanmar.76 
Another area where the Charter’s contribution has been subject to question is the funding and 
capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat. The Secretariat, based in Jakarta, was initiated in 1976 
and has been expanded in stages since, to reach in 2007 a size of about 60 professional staff, 
operating on a budget of less than US$10 million per year. The Secretariat has to support 
500–600 meetings annually, including those focussing on ASEAN’s ambitious programs for 
economic integration. The Secretariat has gained assistance from several major donor 
countries to support and increase its capacities (including the US, Japan and Australia).77 The 
Charter did introduce two new positions of Deputy Secretary General, to be recruited on 
merit. However, the Secretariat has been limited by the size of its overall budget and the fact 
that contributions to it are provided by each member equally and not on terms which 
recognise members’ widely varying overall economic size or per capita incomes. The failure 
so far of the Charter to revise the basis of funding for the Secretariat has been seen as a 
limitation in its contribution to enhancing the Association’s capacities overall.78 The ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers in their joint communiqué in Singapore in July 2008 noted the importance 
of strengthening the Secretariat and providing it with adequate resources, and effective 
implementation of this commitment will clearly be important if the Secretariat is to be able to 
handle its wide and growing range of responsibilities.79  
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The Charter has stimulated considerable debate in ASEAN circles on just how far it 
represents a step forward. This was reflected in a notable public debate in Singapore in July 
2008 between two highly experienced former officials and academic figures. In a critique in 
July 2008, Ambassador Barry Desker (head of the Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies) argued that while the Charter had moved ASEAN forward in some ways, it was a 
disappointment overall.  Desker suggested that Myanmar’s involvement in the preparation of 
the Charter had meant that ‘ASEAN’s traditional emphasis on non-interference and the 
sovereignty of states is upheld.’ While the Charter had introduced some changes to ASEAN’s 
organisational style, including the establishment of two new positions of deputy secretary 
general, it had not provided for increased resources for the Secretariat overall. Desker argued 
that: ‘The question arises whether ASEAN needed a charter or whether its energies would 
have been better spent in increasing functional cooperation among its member.’80  
In a response to Desker, Ambassador Tommy Koh (Chairman of the Institute of Policy 
Studies, Singapore and Singapore’s representative on the group which drafted the Charter) 
viewed the Charter in a more positive light. The Charter, he argued, has introduced a number 
of new principles and objectives for the Association, including the promotion of human rights 
and support for constitutional government. Myanmar’s participation had not compromised 
the development of the Charter. Koh also argued that the Charter should assist ASEAN in the 
area of compliance with agreements, because the Secretary General was now able to monitor 
these issues and report non-compliance to the Summit. Koh concluded: ‘The charter is not 
perfect but it is a good one. Let us not make the best the enemy of the good. With the charter 
and the economic blueprint, we have the possibility to construct a new ASEAN which we can 
all be proud of.’81 
As supporters of the Charter have pointed out, it is intended to be a ‘living document’ which 
under Article 50 can be reviewed five years after it enters into force ‘or as otherwise 
determined by the ASEAN Summit’.82 A key question will be whether the Charter will serve 
as a springboard for additional constructive debate and institutional development in the 
Association to assist it to adapt further to fulfil its own ambitious cooperation goals. 
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ASEAN in 2008 
The Charter process: next steps 
In the second half of 2008, the next important steps in relation to the ASEAN Charter are the 
ratification process and the development of proposals for an ASEAN human rights body.  
By the end of July 2008, seven states had ratified the Charter: Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Myanmar, which announced its ratification during the 
ASEAN meetings in Singapore on 21 July. Of the three remaining states, Thailand’s 
parliament endorsed the Charter on 16 September 2008, with full ratification expected after 
Royal approval.83 In the case of the Philippines, President Macapagal-Arroyo stated during 
the Singapore ASEAN Summit in November 2007 that her country would be unlikely to 
ratify the Charter unless human rights conditions improved in Myanmar and opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi was freed.84 While the Myanmar regime has not either liberalised 
its rule or freed Aung San Suu Kyi, President Arroyo in 2008 established an inter-agency task 
force to encourage the Philippines Senate to support ratification. It is considered possible that 
the Philippines will be able to secure ratification even without evident progress in 
Myanmar.85 
Ratification has attracted controversy in Indonesia’s House of People’s Representatives 
(DPR), which is probably the strongest legislative body in the ASEAN region. The DPR has 
refused to endorse an Indonesian ambassador to Myanmar for over a year because of 
concerns about internal conditions in the country. At the time of the ASEAN meetings in July 
2008, some prominent DPR members expressed reservations over the Charter and by late 
July only two political parties (Golkar and President Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party) had 
explicitly expressed support for it. Indonesia, however, is a founding member of ASEAN and 
the host to the Secretariat and it is therefore likely that the Charter will ultimately receive 
support.86 
The other immediate challenge for the Charter process is following through on the 
commitment in the Charter to establish an ASEAN human rights body. The proposal has been 
discussed at a series of workshops but ASEAN’s political diversity has made arriving at a 
consensus difficult. Differences in outlook were apparent at the 7th workshop on the ASEAN 
Regional Mechanism on Human Rights in Singapore in June 2008, which involved over sixty 
delegates from NGOs, think tanks and governments. According to Professor Tommy Koh, a 
key issue has been that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand already have 
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national human rights committees or bodies but Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam are 
not enthusiastic about following this path. Singapore and Brunei are in neither camp but have 
not been able to bridge the gap between the two.87 It will clearly be difficult to achieve an 
outcome which will both receive endorsement from all members while also satisfying the 
expectations of public figures and NGOs in ASEAN’s more liberal and democratic polities.88 
Nonetheless, the holding of detailed discussions about human rights issues at an ASEAN 
level represents a major step ahead in ASEAN political dialogue, and is another reflection of 
the ongoing impact of the climate of debate stimulated by the Charter development process. 
Political leadership issues 
A key issue for ASEAN in 2008 was the extent of political leadership which could be 
deployed by the members to continue to advance the agendas of the ASEAN Community 
project, including the Charter and the human rights body. 
Several members were facing pressing domestic political issues which were likely to 
preoccupy policy-makers’ attention. Thailand was facing ongoing political conflict between 
supporters and opponents of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra which in August 
and early September 2008 involved stand-offs between demonstrators and the police. In late 
August 2008 ASEAN’s Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan (a former foreign minister of 
Thailand) expressed concern that the ongoing political turmoil in Thailand could adversely 
affect the country’s image as the chair of ASEAN in 2008 and 2009.89 Malaysian politics 
were being dominated by the aftermath of the elections in March, in which opposition forces 
increased greatly their strength in parliament and—after the leading opposition figure Anwar 
Ibrahim re-entered parliament in a by-election on 26 August—were now in a position to pose 
a more potent challenge to the long serving coalition led by the United Malays National 
Organisation.90 Indonesia was entering a phase in which much political attention would be 
dominated by the lead up and conduct of parliamentary and presidential elections in 2009. 
The Philippines also faces national elections in the first half of 2010 and, in the latter half of 
2008, was also facing renewed conflict in the south amid efforts to pursue negotiations to try 
to alleviate the state of disaffection in the Muslim-dominated provinces.91 
While domestic issues preoccupied the attention of a number of members, a sense of some 
urgency was also evident as ASEAN sought to advance its cooperation agenda. Singapore’s 
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Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in addressing the ASEAN ministerial meetings in 
Singapore on 21 July, warned that ASEAN could not take its regional position and sense of 
relevance for granted: 
While we work to strengthen ASEAN, we should also not lose sight of our place in the 
evolving regional and international landscape … 
Because of longstanding tensions and rivalries between the major Asian powers, ASEAN 
could play a useful role as a neutral platform for regional interactions. But major power 
relations are improving, and alternative platforms are emerging, like the Six-Party 
mechanism and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The leaders of China, Japan and South 
Korea are arranging to hold a trilateral Summit in Japan this September, the first outside an 
ASEAN setting. ASEAN cannot take its continued relevance for granted. If our efforts to 
achieve faster and deeper integration falter, ASEAN may well be sidelined.92  
ASEAN’s external ‘dialogue’ relationships 
A key goal of ASEAN from its early days has been to engage the major external powers with 
interests in Southeast Asia in regular dialogue on security and economic issues, particularly 
through the Post Ministerial Conference discussions held with the annual ministerial 
meetings. This strategy has for ASEAN been a way of helping to mediate and manage the 
interests of the major powers in Southeast Asia, while seeking to forestall the danger of 
outright competition and intervention which was a dominant problem in the region for five 
decades from the 1940s.93 
From the late 1970s until the end of the Cold War, these dialogues were focussed heavily on 
political and security issues, as ASEAN engaged its partners to advance ASEAN’s interests 
in areas including efforts to alleviate the problems caused by large scale outflows of refugees 
from the Indochina states after 1975 and then the conflict over Cambodia (until a series of 
regional and international negotiations produced the Paris Agreements of October 1991, 
United Nations-organised elections and the inauguration of a new Cambodian government). 
Political and security issues continue to be a vital part of ASEAN’s external dialogues and 
efforts to counter terrorism have been particularly important since the ‘September 11’ attacks 
in the US in 2001. Since the late 1990s, there has also been an increasing focus on economic 
cooperation, as ASEAN and its partners have been interested to advance both their economic 
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linkages and their overall strategic interests through the pursuit of closer external economic 
relations, often through a series of ‘free trade’ agreements.  
ASEAN’s most crucial external relations continue to be with the ‘big three’ Asia-Pacific 
states, the US, China and Japan.  
The United States, the world’s superpower, has longstanding relationships in Southeast Asia, 
which include formal security alliances with the Philippines and Thailand. The US continues 
to be the dominant maritime power in East Asia, has extensive networks of bilateral 
relationships and has also been interested to participate in emerging multilateral security 
dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, in which it was a founding member from 
1994. Access to the United States market has continued to be a central element in the export-
led economic growth of most ASEAN economies (including Vietnam, for whom the US is its 
largest export destination).  
Table 1: ASEAN Dialogue Partners, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Signatories and East Asian 
Summit Participants 
 ASEAN DP TAC EAS 
Australia 1974 2005 √ 
Bangladesh − 2007 − 
Canada 1977 − − 
China 1996 2003 √ 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea − 2008 − 
European Union 1972 − − 
France − 2007 − 
India 1995 2003 √ 
Japan 1977 2004 √ 
Mongolia − 2005 − 
New Zealand 1975 2005 √ 
Pakistan 1997 (sectoral) 2004 − 
Papua New Guinea − 1989 − 
Republic of Korea 1991 2004 √ 
Russian Federation 1996 2004 − 
Sri Lanka − 2007 − 
Timor-Leste − 2007 − 
United States 1977 − − 
Source: This table is based on material drawn with permission from an unpublished paper (2008) by 
Dr. Malcolm Cook, Mark Thirwell, Dr. John Ravenhill and Dr. Chris Roberts. 
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Table 2: Participation in Regional Institutions 
 ASEAN 
ASEAN +3 
(China, 
Japan and 
South Korea) 
East 
Asian 
Summit 
ASEAN 
Regional 
Forum 
Asia-Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Brunei Darussalam √ √ √ √ √ 
Indonesia √ √ √ √ √ 
Malaysia √ √ √ √ √ 
Philippines √ √ √ √ √ 
Singapore √ √ √ √ √ 
Thailand √ √ √ √ √ 
Cambodia √ √ √ √ − 
Lao PDR √ √ √ √ − 
Myanmar √ √ √ √ − 
Viet Nam √ √ √ √ √ 
Japan − √ √ √ √ 
China − √ √ √ √ 
Republic of Korea − √ √ √ √ 
Australia − − √ √ √ 
New Zealand − − √ √ √ 
India − − √ √ − 
Bangladesh − − − √ − 
Canada − − − √ √ 
Chile − − − − √ 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea − − − √ − 
European Union − − − √ − 
Mexico − − − − √ 
Mongolia − − − √ − 
Pakistan − − − √ − 
Papua New Guinea − − − √ √ 
Peru − − − − √ 
Russian Federation − − − √ √ 
Sri Lanka − − − √ − 
Taiwan − − − − √ 
Timor-Leste − − − √ − 
United States − − − √ √ 
Source: This table is based on material drawn with permission from an unpublished paper (2008) by 
Dr. Malcolm Cook, Mark Thirwell, Dr. John Ravenhill and Dr. Chris Roberts. 
Since ‘September 11’ 2001, the desire of the US to combat the presence and capacities of 
international terrorist groups, and particularly al-Qaeda, has led to increased cooperation with 
almost every government in Southeast Asia (with the exception of Myanmar). In 2003, both 
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Thailand and the Philippines were accorded the status of ‘major non-NATO allies’ and 
security contacts have been enhanced with other states including Malaysia and Indonesia.94 
While US bilateral relations in Southeast Asia have generally been progressing effectively, 
there has been some concern that this has not been matched fully by progress in multilateral 
relations with ASEAN. The US has been an official dialogue partner of ASEAN since 1977 
and its Secretary of State normally has regular annual meetings with her/his ASEAN 
counterparts. The US’s heavy emphasis since September 2001 on counter-terrorism issues, 
however, has been seen as being sometimes narrow in focus and the US administration has 
not always given ASEAN the individual attention it has sought. For example, concerns were 
expressed when Secretary Rice was unable to attend the annual ASEAN foreign ministers’ 
meetings and the ARF in July 2005 and again in July 2007. At the same time, China since the 
late 1990s is considered widely to have been very effective in its development of relations 
with the ASEAN region.95 
The US has recently sought to raise the profile of its multilateral association with ASEAN. In 
November 2005 the US and ASEAN endorsed a ‘Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-US 
Enhanced Partnership’ which called for pursuit of a wide range of political, economic and 
social cooperation.96 The US and ASEAN concluded a Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement (seen as a potential precursor to an FTA) in August 2006.97 The US, having 
concluded a bilateral free trade agreement with Singapore in 2003, has also pursued bilateral 
free trade discussions with Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam although none of these had come 
to fruition by mid-2008 and further progress seems unlikely before the advent of a new 
administration in Washington in 2009.98 
The profile of US relations with ASEAN was to have been raised further in 2007 with a joint 
US-ASEAN summit meeting of heads of government to have been held in Singapore on 5 
September 2008. However, ASEAN’s expectations for the meeting were disappointed when 
it was announced that President Bush would be unable to participate: it is hoped to convene 
the meeting later.99 
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The US has taken additional steps in 2008 to reaffirm relations. In April, the US became the 
first country to nominate an Ambassador to ASEAN: Scott Marciel would take up the 
position (which he would hold concurrently with his role as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Southeast Asia). It was reported that the US hoped that the appointment would 
encourage other countries to follow suit and help establish a group of diplomats from 
ASEAN partners who could encourage the group’s evolution. While progress on bilateral 
trade agreements with Malaysia and Thailand was limited by the pre-election political 
climate, the US and ASEAN reached another multilateral agreement in February 2008 (the 
ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration—
known as ‘ADVANCE’) intended to build on ongoing cooperation through joint policy 
studies and faster movement towards a ‘single window’ arrangement to streamline customs 
clearance for ASEAN imports and exports.100 While efforts to progress multilateral political 
dialogue remained inhibited by the problem of Myanmar, Secretary of State Rice participated 
in the July 2008 ASEAN dialogues and the ARF. In a meeting with Singapore’s Minister for 
Foreign Affairs George Yeo, Secretary Rice praised ASEAN as a ‘place where people can 
rally and try to solve problems.’ Dr Rice also reaffirmed the US view that ASEAN has an 
important role to play in bringing about change in Myanmar.101 
Some concerns have continued in the US about the potentially adverse impact of the US’s 
preoccupation with issues in the Middle East (especially Iraq) for its interests in Southeast 
and East Asia. However, the US remains a central factor in the security and economic well-
being of the region and its role is congenial to almost every ASEAN member. As the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies has observed: 
Washington’s security interest, which includes a substantial military presence in Southeast 
Asia’s neighbourhood, in effect relieves the ASEAN governments of the need for immediate 
concern over China’s increasing presence. The US is still playing a vital role as a ‘regional 
balance’… The present major power equilibrium in Southeast Asia suits ASEAN members, 
which are mainly keen to enjoy positive relations with both parties and want, above all, to 
avoid having to choose sides between either the Chinese or the Americans. 102 
ASEAN’s relations with China have advanced substantially in the past decade. Relations 
between the People’s Republic of China and Southeast Asia were for many years marked by 
mutual suspicion and reservations, as China gave support to Communist Parties in regional 
states. China also has overlapping claims in the South China Sea with four ASEAN members 
(Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam). However, since the mid-1990s, China-
Southeast Asia relations have improved markedly. The period of the Asian financial crisis 
(from mid-1997) was a watershed for relations. China was seen to have been supportive 
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towards the region and its maintenance of the value of the Yuan (so that China did not 
‘undercut’ its neighbours when they were attempting to stabilise their economies after several 
states had experienced currency devaluations) was appreciated by ASEAN’s members. In the 
wake of the financial crisis, trade and access to foreign direct investment were of particular 
concern to ASEAN members and they were highly aware of China’s growing presence as a 
factor in the regional as well as in the international economy. There were particular anxieties 
that ASEAN states would not be able to compete effectively with China’s booming economy 
in attracting investment.103  
Since 1997, China has pursued closer relations with the ASEAN region both bilaterally and 
multilaterally. China and ASEAN have concluded protocols in areas including human 
resource development, public health, information and communications technology, 
transportation, environment and culture. At the ASEAN-China summit in November 2002 the 
two sides signed agreements including the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea and documents covering non-traditional security threats, economic cooperation 
and agricultural cooperation. At the ASEAN summit in 2003, China took the important step 
of formally acceding to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. At the same summit, 
ASEAN and China signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and 
Prosperity, which addresses a wide range of political, economic, social and security issues.104  
A very significant area of cooperation now underway is the commitment by both sides to 
implement an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA, to include China and the six 
‘older’ ASEAN members–Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand–
by 2010 and the four ‘newer’ members–Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam–by 2015). 
A key motivation on China’s part in pursuing the ACFTA was to allay ASEAN concerns 
about the potential adverse impact on their economies of China’s rapid rise in economic 
strength, particularly when it joined the WTO in 2001 and was able to gain access for its 
highly competitive manufactured products on similar terms to ASEAN exporters in major 
world markets. The ACFTA brings together member states which will have a combined 
population of about 2 billion and a collective gross domestic product of US$3 trillion.105 The 
appeal of the agreement to ASEAN members has been enhanced by China’s offer of ‘early 
harvest’ reductions of tariffs on some products much earlier than the scheduled date for 
inauguration of the overall agreement (so that exporters from ASEAN members can gain 
some rapid and evident advantages from the agreement). With the ACFTA agreement, China 
has been able to both boost its image in the ASEAN region and assert a strongly competitive 
position in economic cooperation in relation to Japan, which reached a multilateral ‘economic 
partnership’ agreement with ASEAN in April 2008.  
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While China-ASEAN relations are close they also involve some tensions and potential 
discord. In relation to the South China Sea, it has not been possible to extend the 2002 accord 
to the level of a legally-binding Code of Conduct; China has preferred to deal with ASEAN 
members on a bilateral basis rather than multilaterally. Myanmar is a focus of some 
difference in emphasis given that China’s close relationship with the Myanmar government is 
a major obstacle to ASEAN efforts to promote more liberal approaches by the regime. China 
also faces the ongoing and very strong influence in the region of the US and Japan. China is 
understood to be working on further ways to advance its ASEAN relations. It announced the 
appointment of an ambassador to ASEAN during the July 2008 meetings. Some new 
initiatives may be announced at the next Summit in Bangkok in December 2008, including a 
multi-billion dollar development fund to be used for infrastructure and public works in the 
ASEAN and Mekong sub-region.106 
Since the end of World War II Japan has developed close and cooperative relations in 
Southeast Asia. In these relations Japan has faced fewer problems from legacies of past 
involvements than it often encounters in Northeast Asia: Japan was not a long-term colonial 
occupying power in Southeast Asia and its presence during World War II was viewed in 
some countries (such as Indonesia) at least partly as a catalyst which helped to facilitate the 
decline of European colonial authority. Japanese trade and investment have played a major 
role in Southeast Asian economic development and from the 1980s Japanese industry 
relocated many manufacturing facilities to the region.  
Japan has supported ASEAN’s development and has been a dialogue partner since 1977. 
Japan was a major contributor to the international response to assist regional economies 
affected by the Asian financial crisis from mid-1997. Japan has acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (in 2004) and has participated actively in ASEAN’s efforts 
towards wider regional dialogue, including through the ARF, the ASEAN Plus Three 
grouping and the East Asia Summit (see below). Japan announced plans to nominate an 
ambassador to ASEAN in July 2008, once the ASEAN Charter comes into effect.107 Japan’s 
interest in and support for ASEAN has continued to grow and encompasses many areas of 
cooperation, including human resource development and counter-terrorism. In December 
2005, at the 11th ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, Japan and ASEAN issued a joint 
declaration affirming their commitment to deepen relations. Japan provided a commitment of 
US$70 million to support ASEAN’s regional integration projects and the two sides pledged 
to continue cooperation in areas including the threat of terrorism, transnational crime, avian 
influenza (with Japan committing US$135 million to assist in preventative measures), rising 
oil prices and natural disasters.108  
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In the last decade Japan’s prominence as a regional partner for Southeast Asia has been 
challenged strongly by the rising economic and political influence of China. Concerned to 
maintain its influence and involvement in the region, Japan for its part has pursued its own 
economic agreements—which it terms Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)—in the 
ASEAN region. The Economic Partnership Agreements are intended to cover not only trade 
liberalisation but also areas including free (or at least ‘freer’) movement of labour and 
provisions on investment protection, intellectual property rights and cultural and educational 
cooperation. Japan has so far signed EPAs with Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines. The EPA signed with the Philippines (in September 2006) was notable for 
the inclusion of provisions for Japan to accept nurses and care workers (albeit under strict 
conditions, including Japanese language proficiency).109 
Japan has also been negotiating an overall trade agreement with ASEAN. Japan has faced the 
problem that its key domestic agriculture sectors have been unwilling to accept liberalisation 
proposals. The EPA reached with the Philippines, for example, excluded key agricultural 
items from liberalisation, including rice, wheat, barley, beef and pork.110 In April 2008, 
multilateral relations took a significant step forward when Japan and ASEAN announced 
agreement on a comprehensive economic partnership. The agreement is wider than a FTA in 
that it also covers services and investment. ASEAN within the next ten years is expected to 
benefit from the elimination of tariffs on 93 per cent of their exports to Japan. ASEAN 
members will lower tariffs on Japanese goods, with the more developed members such as 
Indonesia and Thailand moving more quickly than the newer members. The EPA should help 
Japan tie itself further into the ASEAN region and bolster its position as a partner vis a vis 
China.111 Alongside these developments, Japan has also announced an ambitious proposal for 
a wider 16 country trade and economic agreement (covering the members of the East Asia 
Summit) which has added another strand to the debate and diplomacy over economic 
cooperation in East Asia (see below). 
ASEAN’s other significant partners include South Korea, which has been a dialogue partner 
since 1979 and is a signatory to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. ASEAN has negotiated 
a Free Trade Agreement with South Korea which was concluded in 2006.112 The end of the 
Cold War opened up new prospects for ASEAN’s relations with Russia, hitherto marked by 
distance and suspicion. Russia has valued the chance to participate in ASEAN’s Post 
Ministerial Conferences (since 1991), becoming a full dialogue partner in 1996 and holding 
its first leadership summit with ASEAN in December 2005. Russia offers ASEAN 
cooperation in science, technology and arms procurement but its profile is limited overall by 
its comparatively small-scale trade relationship, which is dwarfed by those of other partners 
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such as the US, Japan and China.113 India is becoming an increasingly relevant partner for 
ASEAN and its greater interest in the East Asia region was symbolised by its membership in 
the East Asia Summit in 2005. In August 2008, the two sides announced that a free trade 
agreement had been arrived at and would be presented for formal agreement.114 
The European Union (EU) became ASEAN’s first dialogue partner in 1972 and a substantial 
multilateral relationship has been developed. Relations were pioneered by the two sides’ 
economics ministers, with ASEAN keen to increase access for its exports to European 
markets. Dialogue at foreign minister level began in 1978 and has since been conducted 
every two years. The two sides entered into a Cooperation Agreement in 1980 which has 
involved many areas of contact and activity. The issue of Myanmar, however, has been a 
problem in the relationship: the EU refused to allow Myanmar to sign the Cooperation 
Agreement and the situation in that country has been a regular focus for discussions between 
the EU and ASEAN. The two sides began negotiations for a free trade agreement in 2007 and 
on 22 November 2007 the first ever EU-ASEAN Summit was held in Singapore (during 
ASEAN’s Summit) to celebrate 30 years of cooperation.115 In September 2008 it was 
announced that the EU plans to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009.116 
A further channel for dialogue has been provided by the Europe-Asia Meetings (ASEM), 
initiated in 1996, which have brought together every two years the EU members and the 
ASEAN members along with Japan, China and South Korea. EU concerns about Myanmar 
prevented Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar from joining ASEM until 2004. ASEM has 
continued as a top-level forum of government leaders: it has been supported by the Asia-
Europe Foundation, based in Singapore. 117  
ASEAN’s other dialogue partners include New Zealand, Canada and the United Nations 
Development Programme: Australia’s relationship is discussed in detail below.118 
ASEAN and wider East Asian regional cooperation 
While it has sought to consolidate relations among its own members and to engage major 
partners in regular dialogues, ASEAN has also sought to play a role in fostering institutional 
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dialogue and cooperation on a wider regional basis in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific regions. 
These efforts have, since the mid-1990s, been one of ASEAN’s most prominent areas of 
emphasis. The three major expressions of this have been the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
ASEAN Plus Three process, and the East Asia Summit. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was initiated in 1994 to extend ASEAN’s role in 
sponsoring dialogue on security issues in the East Asia region. It was conceived as a ‘process 
not an institution’.119 The ARF now has 27 participants including the ASEAN ten, the US, 
China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.120 
The ARF emerged from discussions among ASEAN members and their dialogue partners on 
how the role of the Post Ministerial Conference might be extended to sponsor multilateral 
discussions on regional security issues. The Forum was conceived as a group that would be 
inclusive in membership but with ASEAN playing the leading role. Thus at the second Forum 
meeting in Brunei in 1995 the chairman’s statement declared that, ‘A successful ARF 
requires the active, full and equal participation and cooperation of all members. However, 
ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force.’121 To affirm ASEAN’s 
role, it was declared that the ARF should take place annually in the context of ASEAN’s 
ministerial and Post Ministerial Conferences. The Forum’s method and approach were clearly 
patterned after ASEAN’s. The view that the ‘ASEAN Way’ was the only feasible one for the 
Forum was reflected clearly in the 1995 chairman’s statement: ‘The ARF process shall move 
at a pace comfortable to all participants… The approach shall be evolutionary… Decisions of 
the ARF shall be made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all 
participants.’122  
The ARF was established in an environment of strategic uncertainty in East Asia after the 
demise of the Soviet Union and in a region which had no multilateral forums for security 
dialogue. The Forum aimed to bring together the major powers with interests in regional 
security, including Japan, China and the United States. Ralf Emmers (Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Singapore) has observed that: 
ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF resulted from several motivations. It was regarded 
by ASEAN as a diplomatic instrument to promote a continuing United States involvement 
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in the region and to encourage China into habits of good international behaviour. The ARF 
was thus viewed as a means to both socialise Beijing in a comprehensive fashion while 
keeping Washington engaged in the region. Furthermore, the creation of the ARF was meant 
to ensure the ongoing relevance of ASEAN. Its members needed to avoid being excluded 
from a new strategic architecture that was chiefly dependent on a Sino-Japanese-US 
triangle. ASEAN hoped therefore to consolidate its diplomatic position by further 
developing its stabilising role in Southeast Asia and beyond. 123 
The ARF has largely succeeded in fulfilling ASEAN’s original goals for it. The ARF has 
been useful as a venue for China to gain experience in regional multilateral dialogue, which 
has been a positive step as China was initially unenthusiastic about the concept. The US, with 
its strong set of bilateral security relationships in the region, was initially cool towards the 
ARF but under the Clinton administration increased its involvement, although its bilateral 
security relationships remain paramount in its regional strategies.124  
ARF meetings are held at Foreign Minister level annually in July, in conjunction with the 
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC). The ARF has minimal institutionalisation, 
consensus decision making and uses both ‘first and second track’ (i.e. official level and 
NGO/academic level) diplomacy.125 The ARF agreed in 1995 on a gradual three-stage 
evolution of confidence building, preventive diplomacy and in the longer term, approaches to 
conflict resolution.126 ASEAN spokespersons continue to emphasise the Forum’s value. At a 
meeting in September 2006 Malaysia’s Minister for Defence stated that, ‘Through this forum 
we can sit down together to understand the root causes of these security issues, create 
awareness and build up confidence which will allow us to narrow the gap of uncertainty.’127 
The ARF is so far generally considered to have been a modest success as a useful vehicle for 
discussion and confidence building. The Forum’s plenary and inter-sessional discussions 
have had some practical results. These include the issuing of annual defence policy 
statements and additional White Papers, which contribute to greater ‘transparency’; military 
exchanges at staff college level; growing involvement of defence officials in ARF 
discussions; and the creation of an ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons, who can be 
called on by Forum members in conflict situations.128 However, the ARF’s premium on non-
                                                 
123.  Ralf Emmers, ‘ASEAN Regional Forum: time to move towards Preventative Diplomacy’, RSIS 
Commentaries, Singapore, 25 October 2007. 
124.  Evelyn Goh, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian strategy’, Pacific 
Review, vol. 17, no. 1, March 2004, pp. 47–69. 
125.  The ‘second track’ discussions are conducted particularly by the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)—see http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/ 
126.  Barry Desker, ‘The Future of the ASEAN Regional Forum’, Perspectives, Institute of Defence 
and Strategic Studies, Singapore, October 2001. 
127.  ‘ASEAN: centre of Asian boom amid security fears?’ SEAPSNet, September 2006. 
128.  Simon, op. cit., p. 23. 
38 
ASEAN’s regional cooperation and multilateral relations: recent developments and Australia’s interests 
 
confrontation means that it does not have a mandate to intervene directly in security disputes. 
The Forum’s limits were illustrated clearly during the crisis over East Timor in 1999. 
Although the crisis involved a core member of ASEAN (Indonesia), the ARF was not able 
itself to take any significant action, although several ASEAN members did take part in the 
United Nations sponsored peacekeeping efforts led by INTERFET and UNTAET.129  
The Forum has recently pursued practical cooperation in areas including disaster relief (with 
a ‘desk top’ planning exercise held in Jakarta in May 2008 and a ‘live’ exercise to be hosted 
by the US and the Philippines in 2009), meetings of experts to discuss peacekeeping, and 
cooperation on maritime security, including a ‘desk top’ exercise in 2007.130 The ARF has 
also begun to move beyond its agreed first stage of confidence-building, to explore 
possibilities for preventive diplomacy. At its 2007 meeting in Manila, the ARF members 
adopted provisions for a rapid response group able to respond to emergencies. The group, 
called the ‘Friends of the ARF Chair’, will comprise three ARF foreign ministers who can 
assist the chairman and will be convened for specific tasks such as immediate threats to 
security. In addition The ARF agreed on a Cooperative Framework on Counterterrorism and 
Transnational Crime which covers eleven areas including transport security, information 
exchange and management of the impact of terrorist acts.131  
However it is not clear how much further the ARF can go to extend its role in security 
dialogue in the region. Its membership is wide and diverse and finding a consensus among 
the members has not been easy. It is not in a position to address directly some of the most 
significant security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the situation of Taiwan, the 
North Korean nuclear issue or the situation in Kashmir (because particular member countries 
would veto such attempts). The limitations of the diverse and consensus-based ARF have 
been illustrated by the advent of the Six Party Talks process in relation to North Korea’s 
nuclear program. This group is smaller and confined to those major parties with immediate 
interests in the issues being addressed. The operations of the Six Party Talks process so far 
(while not yet a success) have led to suggestions that they could ultimately evolve into a 
‘Northeast Asia security forum’ which would not have ASEAN participation and would be 
seen to be performing roles the ARF had not been able to. The ARF also faces the challenge 
that additional regional groups could come to assume a greater cogency in relation to security 
dialogue, including ASEAN Plus Three, which is more geographically focused than the now 
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very diverse ARF. Having achieved its original aims for ASEAN, the Forum now faces the 
challenge of extending its role and relevance to its members.132 
The ASEAN Plus Three process 
ASEAN members have also been interested in developing wider dialogues with a special 
focus on interactions specifically among the countries of East Asia.  
There was some support within East Asia for an ‘Asia-focused’ form of cooperation at least 
from the early 1990s when Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir proposed an ‘East Asia 
Economic Group’ which would have an exclusively Asian membership. At this time, the 
concept of an East Asian-focussed grouping did not meet with thoroughgoing approval in the 
region. Japan, in particular, did not support the concept.133 Furthermore, attention on regional 
cooperation in the early 1990s was focused on the development of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) grouping of Asia-Pacific economies.  
However a series of factors from the mid-1990s increased support for an East Asian-focussed 
grouping. These included; 
• the inauguration of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) in 1996, which explicitly involved 
dialogue between Europe and an ‘Asian side’ 
• the traumatic impact on many regional economies of the Asian financial crisis from mid-
1997, which prompted many regional states to consider the desirability of greater 
cooperation to forestall any future crisis and to add greater ‘weight’ for Asia in relations 
with international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
• APEC’s inability to maintain the momentum towards trade liberalisation it had in the mid-
1990s 
• a continuing sense that the ongoing development of regional groupings in Europe (the 
European Union) and the Americas (the North American Free Trade Agreement) should 
be accompanied by greater East Asian cooperation; and  
• China’s dynamic economic growth which stimulated a rise in the importance of trade 
among the countries of East Asia.  
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All these developments contributed to the opening up of ‘political space’ for an East Asian 
grouping.134 
ASEAN’s first major step towards wider cooperation in East Asia was the inauguration of the 
‘ASEAN Plus Three’ process, which stemmed from a meeting of the ASEAN members and 
China, Japan and South Korea in Kuala Lumpur in 1997. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is not a 
formalised organisation but is a loose cooperative framework based on conferences and 
dialogue. The APT members have pursued dialogues at several different levels 
simultaneously: among all thirteen members, among the ASEAN ‘ten’ and one other member 
(which has enabled China and Japan, in particular, to maintain and develop their own specific 
relationships with ASEAN), and among the three Northeast Asian members (China, Japan 
and South Korea)—who held their first trilateral meeting in 1999.135 
The APT process has involved annual meetings of the members’ leaders (held during 
ASEAN’s Summits), and many meetings of ministers and senior officials in areas including 
politics and security, trade, labour, agriculture and forestry, tourism, energy and environment. 
China has also sponsored a study to explore the feasibility of an ‘East Asia Free Trade Area’ 
among the thirteen APT countries.136 The most significant element in APT activities so far, 
however, has been the promotion of regional financial cooperation, in two major ways. 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis from 1997, there were widespread sentiments in 
East Asia that reliance on international financial institutions (particularly the International 
Monetary Fund) was no longer entirely adequate for the economies of the region. Some 
adversely affected countries considered that the IMF had been unduly tough in its conditions 
for assistance to the East Asian states. One initial response to these views came from Japan, 
which proposed that an ‘Asian Monetary Fund’ should be established in which Japan could 
be expected to play a leading role. This proposal met with opposition from the US and also 
from China. From 1999, however, the APT group sponsored another proposal to increase 
financial communication and interaction among the East Asian economies through the 
‘Chiang Mai Initiative’, which involves a series of ‘currency swap’ arrangements (initially on 
a bilateral basis) between the central banks of participating states. The arrangements provide 
the potential for regional countries to offer assistance to an ASEAN Plus Three member 
which faces financial difficulties and currency instability—without having to wait for action 
from the IMF or other authorities. The arrangements involve a surveillance mechanism so 
that the performance of the assisted country could be overseen by other regional states. The 
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total amount committed to the ‘currency swap’ arrangements is now over US$83 billion, 
although the amount available to any one member would be only a fraction of this total.137 
On 4 May 2008 the APT finance ministers announced a further development of their financial 
cooperation. The ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’ would now be extended to involve the commitment 
of US$80 billion on a multilateral basis into a regional fund to help protect regional 
currencies from speculative attacks. This announcement has been made in an environment 
where most East Asian economies are now in substantially different positions from those 
faced at the time of the 1997 financial crisis. Most economies now have current account 
surpluses and are not seen to be in danger of speculative attacks or liquidity crises. The 
finance ministers’ announcement also made it clear that major technical issues have still to be 
finalised on exactly how such a fund would operate. The proposed multilateral fund has, 
however, been seen as a further useful avenue towards regional economic cooperation and 
one which is being pursued in association with, and not in opposition to, the existing 
international arrangements, especially the IMF.138  
The second major aspect of regional financial cooperation has involved the development of 
an Asian bond market. The intention of this program is to enable increased access for 
regional investors to funds from the large stocks of savings in the East Asian economies. In 
particular, the Asian bond program is intended to enable East Asian entities to borrow funds 
from other East Asian countries’ reserves which are denominated in local currencies, rather 
than the currencies of the major industrial economies. Development of an Asian bond market 
has also been seen as a valuable way of enhancing interaction between China and other 
regional economies. To date, however, the progress has been very modest, in large part 
because of domestic regulations that prevent bond markets from operating effectively139  
The APT grouping faces some significant internal tensions and obstacles to the consolidation 
of accord and cooperation. The group is highly diverse in character, given that it includes 
advanced market economies, the two most significant Communist led market oriented 
systems and a number of less developed states. The three northeast Asian members have also 
faced major differences and tensions in their bilateral relations. China and South Korea have 
developed a notably close economic relationship since their diplomatic relations were 
normalised in 1990 but the existence of ongoing suspicions was evident in a dispute over a 
historical claim in 2004. Relations between Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea 
have also had substantial tensions. While economic relations in both cases are very extensive, 
suspicions and tensions over history and especially the legacy of World War II remain, 
although the Japan-China relationship has recently improved after further dialogue in 2008 
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between Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and President Hu Jintao.140 The potential for further 
development of ASEAN Plus Three cooperation will depend especially on the climate of 
China-Japan relations.  
At the meeting of the APT foreign ministers in Singapore on 22 July 2008, the ministers held 
talks ‘in retreat format’ for the first time and expressed satisfaction that their relations had 
‘…reached a high level of comfort…’ They also reaffirmed the priority they attach to their 
cooperation. The Chairman’s Statement after the meeting stated that: 
They reaffirmed that the ASEAN Plus Three process would continue to be the main vehicle 
towards the long-term goal of building an East Asian community, with ASEAN as the 
driving force. At the same time they recognised and supported the mutually reinforcing and 
complementary roles of the ASEAN Plus Three and such regional fora as EAS, ARF, APEC 
and ASEAN to promote East Asia community building.141 
The ASEAN Plus Three grouping has become a significant focus for regional dialogue and it 
has encouraged regional leaders to think further about how that dialogue can be best 
advanced. The ASEAN Plus Three leaders have accordingly commissioned studies and 
reports to explore bases for further East Asian cooperation—which encouraged development 
of proposals for an ‘East Asia Summit’. 
The East Asia Summit 
The idea for an East Asia Summit (EAS) arose from discussions within ASEAN Plus Three 
and was raised in a report which that grouping commissioned from the ‘East Asia Study 
Group’ in 2002.142 At ASEAN’s annual summit in Vientiane in December 2004, Prime 
Minister Badawi of Malaysia (as the host of the next ASEAN summit, to be held in Kuala 
Lumpur in 2005) announced that an East Asia Summit would be convened during those 
meetings. On the issue of possible participation, ASEAN, as the convenor of the first EAS , 
made it clear that Summit participants must be signatories of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation (or be prepared to sign it), needed to be full ASEAN Dialogue Partners, and 
had to have substantial relations with ASEAN. 
The political sensitivities involved in East Asia cooperation soon became evident, particularly 
because of the competing interests of China and Japan. As Mohan Malik (Asia-Pacific Center 
for Security Studies, Honolulu) has suggested: 
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The EAS began with a backdrop of intense diplomatic maneuvering and shadow boxing, 
and ended with the power game being played out in the open. China and Japan were locked 
in a bitter struggle for supremacy, with Beijing attempting to gain the leadership position in 
the planned EAC (ie East Asian Community), and Tokyo trying to rein in its rival with the 
help of other “China wary” nations in the Asia-Pacific.143 
China was initially enthusiastic about the Summit proposal and argued that it should most 
appropriately be based on the 13 member countries of ASEAN Plus Three. However it was 
evident that some other states were reserved about the prospect of a Summit based solely on 
the APT membership, since this could be seen to be possibly open to a high level of influence 
from China. Japan, with the support of a number of the members of ASEAN, argued that 
other relevant countries, in particular India and Australia, should be invited to join the new 
forum. China continued to argue against this proposal into the early months of 2005, but most 
ASEAN members supported the Japanese position. It was ultimately resolved that India, 
Australia and New Zealand would be invited as inaugural members of the Summit.144 
After the issue of the participation in the first Summit was agreed, disputation continued 
about the character and possible role of the Summit.145 China argued that the APT 
membership should be considered to be a ‘core’ group in subsequent efforts to develop an 
ultimate ‘East Asia Community’ and is understood to have gained some support for this 
approach from South Korea, Thailand, Myanmar and Malaysia. China’s notion of a ‘two 
tiered’ EAS, with the ASEAN Plus Three grouping as the centre for concerted cooperation 
efforts was resisted by Japan, India, and Australia, with support from countries including 
Singapore and Indonesia. Tensions between China and Japan were evident during the period 
of the first Summit in Kuala Lumpur, when Premier Wen Jiabao refused to hold a bilateral 
meeting with his counterpart Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.146 
The first East Asia Summits: 2005 and 2007 
The initial Summits have been cautious attempts to develop dialogue and bases for 
consensus. The first East Asia Summit on 14 December 2005 was relatively short (at three 
hours) and few specific decisions were made. The emphasis was on developing 
communication among the members. The main issues discussed included the need for de-
nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, terrorism, avian flu, sustainable development, the 
need for progress in the Doha round of World Trade Organization negotiations and the role 
which the EAS should play as a complement to existing cooperation dialogues (including 
ASEAN Plus Three) in the process of community building in the region. 
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The leaders’ statement issued by the Summit (the ‘Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East 
Asia Summit’) affirmed that the EAS is intended to be an ‘open, inclusive, transparent and 
outward-looking forum, in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally 
recognised values, with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with other 
participants of the East Asia Summit’. The Summit would be ‘convened regularly’, would be 
hosted and chaired by an ASEAN member and would be held ‘back to back with the annual 
ASEAN Summit’. 147 
The second EAS, in Cebu on 15 January 2007, continued the cautious style of the first. The 
discussions covered much the same ground addressed in 2005, with an additional emphasis 
on energy efficiency and conservation and climate change, with a range of cooperative 
programs and voluntary endeavours promoted. The third Summit held in Singapore in 
November 2007 placed emphasis on developing dialogue on energy and climate change 
issues. The third Summit also endorsed the establishment of a new research body for the 
region, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, known as ERIA. ERIA, a 
primarily Japanese-backed think tank, was launched in May 2008 and will be based initially 
at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. ERIA is expected to serve as both a policy making and 
training forum and is also expected to be involved in infrastructure planning and the 
development of further plans for regional economic integration, particularly Japan’s proposal 
for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia.148 
ASEAN and East Asian cooperation: continuing debate 
Discussion and debate on how best to pursue East Asia cooperation have been continuing in 
the aftermath of the first East Asia Summit. China had offered to host the second meeting of 
the Summit in Beijing. However, it was decided that ASEAN would assume the role of 
convening the Summit alongside the ASEAN Summits, and therefore in Southeast Asian 
states only.  
Discussion has continued about membership. The first EAS had attracted interest from some 
major countries not invited to participate. Russia made an attempt to gain representation. 
While its request was not agreed to, Russia did attend the first Summit as an observer and 
may be invited to join as a full member in the future.149  
The United States has viewed the Summit with interest. Ever since the formation of APEC in 
1989, US policymakers have favoured modes of regional cooperation in East Asia in which 
the US can participate and have been wary about institutional arrangements which might 
‘divide’ the region from the US. Some American observers have expressed concern that the 
East Asia Summit will be a venue where major East Asia states including China and Japan 
will be represented but the US will not, and which could be another avenue for China to 
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sponsor dialogues and discussions which define ‘East Asian’ cooperation as not needing to 
include the US.150 Other analysts have argued that the US does not have to be a member of 
every major regional forum and that this need not compromise its regional involvement or 
role.151 
The question of how the US reacts to, and is able to interact with, the East Asia Summit will 
be one of the most significant issues in the early phases of the new grouping’s activities. If 
the US was to develop an interest in joining the Summit, it would need first to sign the TAC. 
This possibility has been viewed with reserve by elements in the US government concerned 
that this might impinge on US alliance relationships or defence deployments. However, all 
the US’s allies in East Asia have acceded to the Treaty with no evident adverse impacts on 
their alliance relationships with the US. It is possible that a new US administration after the 
2008 elections may look again at this issue and the potential relevance for the US for 
participation in the EAS.152 
The issue of the relationship between the EAS and the ASEAN Plus Three grouping also 
remains under debate. Some countries, and particularly China, continue to consider that the 
APT should remain at the centre of substantive cooperation and ‘community building’. For 
example, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Badawi said in a speech in May 2007 that the ASEAN 
Plus Three process was the best vehicle for East Asia community building. The EAS and 
APEC were important forums but he said that, ‘Building a community involves co-operation 
not only in the economic and trade areas but in every major aspect of human activity, 
including economic, social and political areas. Only the ASEAN Plus Three process seeks to 
build an Asian community, or more specifically an East Asian community.’153 
By contrast, Japan has advanced the concept of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 
East Asia (CEPEA) to contribute to economic integration across East Asia. In discussing this 
concept, Japan has suggested that it should be a broad ranging effort to achieve cooperation 
in areas including trade, investment, intellectual property, services, and common rules of 
origin. The coverage of this effort would be the membership of the EAS, and would therefore 
include India, Australia and New Zealand.154 The CEPEA proposal was raised in late August 
2006 and it is being studied by a ‘track two’ inquiry which is due to report to the fourth EAS 
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in December 2008. The proposal indicates that Japan continues to wish to argue for a concept 
of regional cooperation which extends beyond the ASEAN Plus Three membership. 
The emergence of what are in fact two competing regional groupings with two conceptions of 
how best to pursue East Asian integration is now an important issue for the region. Malcolm 
Cook (Lowy Institute for International Policy) has observed that:  
The reason for why suddenly there are two overlapping East Asian regional bodies and why 
they both let the ASEAN tail wag the East Asian dog is the same reason for the historic lack 
of East Asian regional bodies (and the continued lack of a Northeast Asian one). China and 
Japan do not trust each other and will not accept the other as the paramount regional power, 
while Southeast Asian countries individually and as a group do not fully trust either northern 
giant. China’s rising power and new interest in regional engagement, has triggered the 
change from no regionalism to competing regionalisms. China favours the smaller 
ASEAN+3 process and Japan favours the larger East Asian Summit, with both accepting 
that each organization is less threatening with ASEAN in the proverbial driving seat. 155 
As Cook has noted, the existence of two competing models for integration may be of benefit 
to ASEAN in that it can play a role in shaping how the proposals evolve, although it may be 
necessary to decide which of the approaches—EAS or ASEAN Plus Three—is ultimately 
preferable. There is also an ongoing potential danger that the competition for influence 
between Japan and China, which was evident in the debate over the appropriate membership 
for the EAS, could have a divisive influence in ASEAN itself. 
ASEAN and Australia 
Australia has an important stake in the success of ASEAN’s revitalisation and consolidation 
in its fifth decade and beyond. ASEAN’s development of cooperation and regional 
confidence has benefited Australia’s own security environment. ASEAN’s rapid economic 
growth has made its members a major focus for Australia’s trade. As a result, successive 
governments have affirmed the value of the Australia-ASEAN relationship.  
Relations from 1974 
Australia was the first country outside Southeast Asia to establish a joint relationship with 
ASEAN, inaugurated in Canberra in April 1974. Cooperation focused initially on multilateral 
economic assistance to ASEAN, which became the Australia-ASEAN Economic Cooperation 
Program. In the 1970s, Australia and ASEAN clashed on trade issues at a time when 
Australia was continuing substantial protection for its manufacturing industries. In the late 
1970s, Australia also cooperated closely with ASEAN to alleviate the serious problems posed 
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by the large-scale departures of refugees from the countries of Indochina.156 Since 1979, 
Australia has participated in the Post Ministerial Conferences held after the annual meetings 
of ASEAN foreign ministers, when ASEAN formally consults with its dialogue partners. This 
has given Australia’s foreign ministers regular direct communication with all of their ASEAN 
counterparts. 
In the 1980s, cooperation was enhanced by economic reforms in Australia (including 
financial deregulation and tariff reductions) and in a number of ASEAN countries. From the 
late 1980s, Australia also worked very closely with key ASEAN members—particularly 
Indonesia—to resolve the long-running Cambodia conflict.  
Australia was also keen to see ASEAN enhance its role in dialogue on regional security. 
Australia accordingly played an active role in the discussions which led to the establishment 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum and has been an active participant since its inauguration in 
1994.157 
After the mid-1990s, while cooperation with ASEAN continued, Australia encountered some 
challenges and limitations in relations. The Asian financial crisis from mid-1997 dampened, 
at least for a time, ASEAN’s image as a region of economic success. Australia made major 
contributions towards the assistance packages pursued by the International Monetary Fund 
for several of the worst affected countries especially Thailand and Indonesia, but the potential 
for progress in multilateral relations was impeded by the crisis.158 
As this paper has noted, the financial crisis encouraged moves which had been underway 
since the early 1990s to develop more clearly ‘East Asia-focused’ avenues of cooperation. 
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia was a leading proponent of these moves but a major 
obstacle for Australia was that Dr Mahathir did not favour Australia’s direct participation in 
the newly emerging East Asia oriented dialogues.159 From ASEAN began to hold meetings 
with the European Union in 1996 (in the Asia-Europe Meetings) and a further reflection of 
the East Asian focused cooperation approach was the advent of the ASEAN Plus Three 
process from 1997. Australia was not a part of these significant new dialogues. 
Australia in the 1990s also experienced some strain in key bilateral relations with ASEAN 
members. At a political level, relations with Malaysia were cool although economic and 
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security relations remained close.160 After the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia in 
1998, Australia’s support for moves by the United Nations to hold a ballot on East Timor’s 
status in August 1999 and then its major role in leading UN-endorsed stabilisation efforts 
helped restore security to East Timor, but also saw major strain in relations with Jakarta.161 
In this regional climate, Australia after 2000 experienced some setbacks in its ASEAN 
relations: 
• Australia from the early 1990s had expressed strong interest in developing a link between 
the Australia-New Zealand ‘Closer Economic Relations’ (CER) agreement and the AFTA. 
However, in October 2000, ASEAN economic ministers at a meeting in Chiang Mai 
decided against pursuing any such direct linkage. Instead ASEAN ministers approved 
development of a useful but more limited ‘closer economic partnership’ to pursue trade 
facilitation and capacity building (inaugurated from 2000)162 and 
• Australia had a further setback in 2002 when it sought as a dialogue partner to gain 
participation in ASEAN’s annual leadership meetings, held that year in Phnom Penh. 
Australia’s bid was not accepted. At the 2003 ASEAN summit meetings in Bali, it was 
reported that Australia did not renew its efforts to gain representation and that the issue of 
Australian representation had been dropped from the agenda for discussion and had been 
shelved indefinitely.163 
Relations since 2004: renewal of progress 
In 2004, the climate for progress in Australia-ASEAN relations improved significantly. In 
April 2004—the 30th anniversary of the first multilateral Australia-ASEAN agreement—
ASEAN’s economics ministers, meeting in Singapore, made two important announcements. 
They proposed that the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand should be invited to 
attend a special ‘commemorative summit’ during ASEAN’s annual summit meetings, in 
Vientiane in November 2004. Second, they declared that it would be ‘beneficial to both 
regions to upgrade economic relations to the next level’ by asking for a review of the 
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proposal for a linkage between AFTA and CER.164 The invitation to the summit was duly 
made by ASEAN foreign ministers at the end of June 2004. 
Several factors seem to have been important in encouraging the positive climate since 2004. 
Australia’s regional relations were clearly affected by the post-September 11 international 
climate and concerns about terrorism. From late 2001, attention has been focused on the 
threats posed to the ASEAN region by terrorist movements of which Jemaah Islamiyah has 
been the most prominent. Attention was heightened after the bombings in Bali in October 
2002, at the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, outside the Australian Embassy in 
Jakarta in September 2004 and again in Bali in October 2005. 
Australia has taken a series of actions to expand cooperation on counter-terrorism, signing 
bilateral agreements with a number of ASEAN members and a multilateral declaration with 
ASEAN itself. The Australian Federal Police has also engaged in very close cooperation with 
its regional counterparts.165 This has extended the sense of mutual interest between Australia 
and many ASEAN members. ASEAN’s then Secretary General, Ong Keng Yong emphasised 
in April 2004 that: ‘Australia is a peaceful and stable country. It has a great influence in 
counter-terrorism initiatives and, in this area at least, we are working together and through 
that we can socialise more and be more comfortable together.’166 
In a parallel development, key bilateral relationships improved. With Malaysia, there was a 
noticeable increase in warmth in relations with Australia after the retirement from office of 
Prime Minister Mahathir. Relations with Indonesia also improved substantially after the chill 
in the period of 1999—this improvement continued under the presidency of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono—and was symbolised by the attendance of Prime Minister Howard at President 
Yudhoyono’s inauguration in Jakarta on 20 October 2004.167 The tragic impact of the 
tsunami in December 2004 produced a large scale response from both the Australian 
community and the government which has added additional depth to the relationship.  
The ongoing impact of the rise of China has been a further important factor. ASEAN 
members have been keenly aware that China’s continued remarkable growth is posing 
challenges for the ASEAN members’ capacity to maintain economic dynamism and to 
continue to gain access to foreign investment. The need to achieve more concerted market 
integration among the ten ASEAN members to help them attract investment has been 
regarded as a major motivation for ASEAN in promoting AFTA and the ASEAN Economic 
Community. In this context, an association with the economies of Australia and New Zealand 
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would help boost ASEAN’s access to markets and relevant technical skills to enhance 
economic growth and competitiveness.168  
The rise in popularity of regional ‘free trade agreements’ has also been a significant factor. 
With the World Trade Organization talks moving slowly and reaching an apparent impasse in 
2008 and with APEC’s plans for trade liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific having lost 
momentum since the late 1990s, there has been a trend towards bilateral FTAs (for example 
Singapore-US, South Korea-Chile, Australia-Singapore and Australia-Thailand) and 
proposals for wider regional arrangements, most notably between ASEAN and China. 
Australia also concluded an FTA with the US during 2004. These developments stimulated 
ASEAN to review the desirability of closer economic links with Australia.169 
Australia’s record of continuing favourable rates of growth since the early 1990s has also 
bolstered its relevance as a regional partner.170 
Recent developments 
Since 2004, Australia’s relations with ASEAN have continued to advance in both the 
economic and political arenas.171 
Economic cooperation 
The ASEAN countries, as a grouping of more than 575 million people with a combined GDP 
of more than US$1 trillion, are important economic partners for Australia. As a group, 
ASEAN is for Australia a larger trading partner (16 per cent) than any single country, 
including China (13 per cent), Japan (12 per cent) or the US (11 per cent). Two way 
merchandise trade with ASEAN totalled A$55.2 billion in 2007, with exports at A$18 billion 
and imports at A$37 billion. Australia’s total investment in ASEAN at the end of 2007 was 
A$31.4 billion, with ASEAN investment in Australia at A$52.8 billion. Australia has already 
signed bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Singapore and Thailand, negotiations are 
underway with Malaysia, and a feasibility study is being undertaken with Indonesia. 
Education is a key export with over 65,000 students from ASEAN now studying in Australia 
in 2007. ASEAN countries have been a popular tourist destination for Australians for many 
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years and Australia received over 600 000 tourists arriving from ASEAN countries in 
2006.172 
Aid continues to be an important part of bilateral and multilateral relationships. Australia’s 
total development assistance to ASEAN countries in 2008–09 is estimated at A$902.4 
million. Bilateral programs focus on Indonesia ($463 million), Vietnam ($93.1 million), the 
Philippines ($109.3 million), Cambodia ($55 million) and Laos ($27.8 million). A number of 
regional programs involve assistance to ASEAN members in areas including control of 
infectious diseases and narcotics, and the combating of people-trafficking and child sex 
tourism.173  
A significant area of assistance is directed towards supporting ASEAN’s programs for further 
integration. In 2002 the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program was 
inaugurated as a six year $A45 million program which sought to strengthen regional 
economic and social cooperation, enhance regional institutional capacities, increase science, 
technological and environmental cooperation and assist the newer ASEAN members in their 
integration into ASEAN.174 Under the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program 
(phase two) Australia is providing $57 million over seven years. With this program Australia 
aims to support ASEAN’s goal of establishing an ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. 
The program will focus strongly on helping the poorer ASEAN members to meet the UN 
Millennium Development Goals through stronger economic growth and integration. There 
will be a much stronger emphasis on partnership, with the new program managed jointly with 
the ASEAN Secretariat, and utilising ASEAN Secretariat systems. It will also provide high 
quality economic research and policy advice and implementation support on priority regional 
economic integration issues.175 
Australia, along with New Zealand, has also negotiated a multilateral free trade agreement 
with ASEAN. A study of a possible AFTA-CER agreement prepared by the Centre of 
International Economics (CIE) in Australia in 2000 concluded that there could be net gains of 
US$48 billion over the period 2000–2020. The gains would amount to about 0.3 per cent of 
additional GDP for both AFTA and CER by 2010. These benefits would also be likely to 
stimulate additional inflows of foreign investment.176 Linkage would have other benefits. The 
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CIE study noted that ‘As economies integrate, so contacts, networks and trust grows so that 
confidence in business relationships follows’. An AFTA-CER link could also have a useful 
effect in encouraging further liberalisation in APEC overall.177 
On 28 August 2008, an agreement was announced for the long-anticipated ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA). The agreement was introduced 
with enthusiastic statements by the twelve trade ministers involved. The joint ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand statement said that: 
The Ministers noted that the Agreement is an important milestone in the long-standing 
ASEAN-CER comprehensive partnership. As a living document, the Agreement brings to a 
new height the level of cooperation and relationship between the governments of ASEAN, 
Australia and New Zealand as well as its peoples.  
The Ministers see the Agreement as paving the way to enhancing the region’s economic 
integration and acting as an impetus to deepen and broaden the trade and investment among 
the twelve participating countries. The Ministers noted that the Agreement is comprehensive 
in scope covering trade in goods, investment, trade in services, financial services, 
telecommunications, electronic commerce, movement of natural persons, intellectual 
property, competition policy and economic cooperation.178 
In an individual statement on the same day, Australia’s Minister for Trade Simon Crean said 
that Australia stood to gain considerably from the agreement across many sectors:  
We’ve locked in goods market access gains in a wide range of sectors including agriculture 
and industrial products. We’ve also secured a good outcome on services, which will create 
more certainty for exporters in sectors such as engineering, education and the financial 
sector. The agreement includes provisions providing greater certainty and transparency for 
Australian investors. We have achieved significant tariff reductions and are working to 
secure further improvements with two countries. In particular, we are also seeking to 
strengthen the outcome for our automotive industry with Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Importantly, we’ve got a commitment from our negotiating partners to build on these 
outcomes into the future. 
AANZFTA seeks to capitalise on new trade and economic opportunities that will arise from 
the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community. To put this FTA in perspective it is 
the most comprehensive trade agreement that ASEAN has ever negotiated. In terms of 
coverage, it’s the largest FTA Australia has ever negotiated—covering 16 per cent of 
Australia’s trade in goods and services, worth $71 billion. This is a big market of 570 
million people with a combined GDP of US$1 trillion. AANZFTA will strengthen our trade 
and investment ties with ASEAN….  
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Today’s agreement sends a positive signal of the economic dynamism of our region and 
provides a building block for regional integration.179 
Details of the agreement were not released at the time of the 28 August announcement; they 
are expected to be revealed at the time of the formal signing process, due in December 2008. 
It has been reported that Australian wine, beef, dairy and horticultural producers are expected 
to be among the prime beneficiaries. In comments in Singapore, Mr Crean said that the 
agreement would also open opportunities for Australian insurance and financial sectors in 
Indonesia and education services in Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Engineering, 
architectural and construction firms are also expected to benefit. Sugar producers may not be 
among those to gain, after resistance to liberalisation of this sector from Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Agreement had not been reached with Indonesia and Malaysia on tariffs in 
relation to cars. Overall it was reported that the deal should cover about 95 percent of all two-
way trade among the parties but more detailed assessments will have to await the release of 
the full terms of the agreement.180 
Political dialogue 
Australia’s political interactions with ASEAN have been enhanced in the past four years. The 
Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand participated in a special ‘commemorative 
summit’ meeting with the ASEAN heads of government at the ASEAN summit in Vientiane 
on 30 November 2004. A major outcome from the meeting was an agreement to pursue 
development of a free trade agreement on a multilateral basis between Australia and New 
Zealand and the ASEAN members. A further important development at the Vientiane summit 
was the suggestion by Malaysia that an East Asia Summit would be convened at the next 
ASEAN summit, to be held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. 
In the early months of 2005 some controversy arose over Australia’s approach to ASEAN’s 
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The Treaty is essentially a declaration of desirable 
goals for the conduct of international relations in Southeast Asia but it is valued by ASEAN 
as an expression of their capacity to contribute to a peaceful regional environment.181 In April 
2005, the ASEAN foreign ministers indicated that adherence to the Treaty would be a pre-
requisite for states who wished to participate in the forthcoming East Asia Summit. By then a 
number of other states had acceded to the Treaty including Papua New Guinea (1989), China 
and India (2003), and Japan, Pakistan, South Korea and Russia (in 2004).182 The Australian 
Government had expressed some reservations about the TAC but in July 2005 Australia 
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agreed to accede to the Treaty and this was done in formal terms in December 2005. This 
cleared the way for Australia to participate in the first EAS.183 
The advent of the East Asia Summit offered a new and high profile venue for Australia to 
interact at leadership level with the ASEAN members and other major Asian countries. Prime 
Minister John Howard participated in the first EAS meetings, in Kuala Lumpur in December 
2005 and Cebu in January 2007, and Foreign Minister Downer attended in Singapore in 
November 2007 (when the Summit took place in the final stages of Australia’s 2007 election 
campaign). 
Australia has continued to pursue its engagement with ASEAN. In a further important step, 
Australia and ASEAN signed on 1 August 2007 a ‘Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-
Australia Comprehensive Partnership’. The then Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Downer 
stated on 1 August that: 
The Declaration reflects the breadth and maturity of the ASEAN-Australia relationship. It 
builds on the momentum of this relationship and provides a framework for our future 
engagement with ASEAN, covering political and security, economic, socio-cultural and 
development cooperation. For example, the Declaration signals Australia’s and ASEAN’s 
intention to enhance cooperation in support of deeper economic integration, environmental 
conservation, communicable and emerging infectious diseases, and disaster preparedness 
and emergency response. The agreement will also promote cooperation in combating 
transnational crimes, including terrorism and drug trafficking.184 
The Rudd Government has reaffirmed Australia’s ASEAN relationship. In June 2008 Prime 
Minister Rudd visited the ASEAN Secretariat, the first head of government of an ASEAN 
dialogue partner to do so. During his visit, Prime Minister Rudd announced on 13 June the 
inauguration of the second phase of the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation 
Program, through which Australia will provide high level policy advice, research and 
implementation support to assist ASEAN in key areas of economic cooperation, including 
harmonisation of standards, elimination of tariffs and reduction of non-tariff barriers.185  
During the ASEAN ministerial meetings in Singapore in July 2008, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Stephen Smith announced that Australia would nominate an Ambassador to ASEAN. 
The ambassador will be a senior Canberra-based diplomat whose duties would include 
participating in meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat and in other regional ASEAN meetings. 
Mr Smith said that since 1974, ‘…we have invested considerable effort in building a 
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partnership that spans people-to-people links, development co-operation, economic and trade 
links and defence and security matters. Our extensive co-ordination on these and other issues 
will be significantly increased through the appointment of an ambassador.’186 
Australia, ASEAN and wider Asia-Pacific cooperation 
Another strand in Australia-ASEAN dialogue was added in June 2008 when Prime Minister 
Rudd argued in a speech in Sydney that it was desirable to review the long-term vision for the 
architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. He argued that this vision needed to embrace, ‘[a] 
regional institution which spans the entire Asia-Pacific region—including the United States, 
Japan, China India, Indonesia and the other states of the region’ and ‘[a] regional institution 
which is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic 
and political matters and future challenges related to security.’ Mr Rudd argued that, ‘At 
present none of our existing regional mechanisms as currently configured are capable of 
achieving these purposes.’ He noted that:  
Such a debate does not of itself mean the diminution of any of the existing regional bodies. 
APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus Three and 
ASEAN itself will continue to play important roles, and longer-term may continue in their 
own right or embody the building blocks of an Asia Pacific Community. There will be wide 
ranging views about this across the region—some more supportive than others. New bodies 
and new ideas will continue to emerge… 
I said before that this is the Asia Pacific Century. Ours must be an open region—we need to 
link into the world, not shut ourselves off from it. And Australia has to be at the forefront of 
that challenge, helping to provide the ideas and drive to build new regional architecture—
something we have not done for over a decade.187 
Mr Rudd announced that he had invited Richard Woolcott, a highly experienced diplomat and 
former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as Australia’s envoy to 
explore attitudes and approaches towards the concept he had proposed. 
In the period since this speech, reactions in the ASEAN region have varied. In July, Prime 
Minister Badawi of Malaysia suggested that it would be desirable to develop the existing 
regional institutions: he said that, ‘We already have a forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum. 
We can continue with the existing institutions.’ Indonesia’s Vice President Yusuf Kalla 
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commented that, ‘For me, its not necessary to make a new body. We already have ASEAN 
and APEC. There is no need for all countries in Asia Pacific to make one objective.’188 Other 
responses have been more supportive. ASEAN’s Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan said on 
13 June during Mr Rudd’s visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta: 
You are now dreaming bigger dreams, scaling another awe inspiring height, swimming a 
wider ocean of hope and vision for a larger Asia-Pacific Community. We welcome your 
new vision. We want to know more about it. We want to help you construct that Community 
of a wider expanse with the existing institutions serving as its foundation. We hope that you 
will accommodate us—ASEAN—in that grand vision of yours, recognizing our traditional 
role and contributions to the many architectures of cooperation existing today in East Asia. 
Australia has always been a catalyst and a strong pillar of those regional architectures of 
cooperation and prosperity in the past.189 
At the time of ASEAN’s Ministerial Meetings in Singapore in July, the official spokesman 
for the meetings, Andrew Tan, commented in a measured vein that: 
On this subject of a pan-Asian regional forum, or whatever name it is to be called, I think 
ASEAN countries have said that they are still waiting for more details of this proposal.  
The region itself is already quite complex so if there can be another regional process that can 
help us better manage this, there is no reason why we should stop it from being developed, 
but it also has to take into account the region’s view as well as regional sensitivities and 
regional circumstance.190 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Smith, speaking on 18 July, shortly before the 
ASEAN ministerial meetings, had affirmed Australia’s interest in engaging in dialogue about 
the future of regional cooperation. He said that: 
Shaping our evolving regional architecture in ways that suit the diverse nation states of our 
region is a challenging task, but it’s a task which the Government believes Australia must be 
engaged in. The Prime Minister’s initiative has started a conversation with our friends and 
neighbours about how the Asia Pacific regional architecture might evolve to meet future 
strategic, security, economic and political challenges and opportunities It’s about what best 
regional architecture might prepare us for these emerging regional and global challenges… 
This conversation doesn’t diminish any of the existing regional bodies. On the contrary, they 
will continue to play their essential roles. There could be a new piece of architecture, as 
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ASEAN and APEC once were. Or it could evolve and emerge from and through the existing 
architecture, as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit have.191 
For his part, Prime Minister Rudd, in a lecture in Singapore on 12 August 2008, made it clear 
that his government views ASEAN as a prime example of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
At the height of the Cold War, 41 years ago, the leaders of five South East Asian nations got 
together to form ASEAN. Singapore was one of the nations that helped to chart the future 
course for ASEAN as a founding member. The world has changed a lot in the intervening 
41 years, but ASEAN has endured. 
In fact, ASEAN has done more than just endure, it has grown and it has matured. During 
Singapore’s Chairmanship of ASEAN over the past 12 months, the ASEAN Charter was 
signed—a new milestone in ASEAN’s evolution. I think that ASEAN’s most impressive 
achievement – and one that is often under-appreciated—is building a sense of regional 
identity, a sense of community, and a sense of neighbourhood. The countries of South East 
Asia have diverse histories, political systems, religious beliefs, social systems and cultural 
backgrounds. But a real sense of community has been forged where there had been 
historically few substantive ties. 
In fact when ASEAN was formed, the member states themselves had been riven by conflict 
then raging through Indochina. Forty years later, by absolute contrast, the habits of 
cooperation have crafted a sense of genuine community. It is a community that defaults first 
towards dialogue rather than confrontation. It is a neighbourhood whose residents seek, first 
and foremost, to cooperate more closely with each other. In this sense, ASEAN represents 
an outstanding essay in institutional success for which member states, including Singapore, 
should be congratulated. 
Some criticise ASEAN for being insufficiently activist. I argue that this criticism is 
misplaced because it fails to appreciate that ASEAN’s great success has been to avoid 
conflict among member states and allow economic development to progress unimpeded by 
intra-regional security concerns. That is why I argue that ASEAN has been a remarkable 
success story… 
Mr Rudd reaffirmed his government’s support for dialogue about the future shape of regional 
architecture and the concept of an Asia Pacific Community (APC). He stated that: 
All of our existing regional mechanisms have a critical role to play both now and into the 
future – including ASEAN, APEC and the EAS. But, at the same time, we need to begin our 
conversation about where our wider region goes from here. And this is where the wider 
region needs to learn from ASEAN’s success – how to build the institutions, habits and 
practices of cooperation across the policy spectrum and across historically uncomfortable 
national divides… 
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Australia remains open to the suggestions of our regional partners as this discussion unfolds. 
Because by definition, an APC by 2020 is very much a long-term project for the future.192 
Concluding comment 
Since 1967 ASEAN has established a substantial presence as a regional group in Southeast 
Asia. Its continuous process of dialogue has not removed all cases of inter-state suspicion and 
tension (as the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia in mid 2008 illustrated vividly) but it 
has contributed to the achievement of a regional security environment which is very much 
more stable and secure than was the case in the late 1960s. It has been able to accept five 
additional members since 1984. ASEAN has been able to engage major external powers in 
regular dialogues and to extend the scope of its cooperation to sponsor wider forums and 
discussion in both East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region, through the ARF, ASEAN 
Plus Three and the East Asia Summit. 
While all these activities have given ASEAN an identity and recognition internationally, the 
group clearly faces some major problems in maintaining its utility and credibility. Its 
membership is diverse in both economic and political character. The expansion of 
membership in the late 1990s resulted in the presence of Myanmar, whose autocratic 
government has performed very poorly in both political and economic management and has 
resisted ASEAN efforts at political influence. ASEAN has been able to play a valuable role in 
2008 as an intermediary and a sponsor of aid in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, but overall 
Myanmar has been an embarrassment to the Association in its relations with major powers 
(including the US). Faced with the ongoing economic challenge of China and also of India, 
ASEAN is moving to deepen its cooperation in economic, security and socio-cultural areas. 
All of these projects face big challenges in securing effective implementation and adherence 
from members who are highly reluctant to forego any of their own sovereignty and national 
interests. At the same time, the process of political liberalisation in a number of members 
(most notably in Indonesia since 1998) has led to an increasing profile for non-governmental 
organisations which are keen to see ASEAN live up to its declared goals. The challenges for 
ASEAN in meeting the needs of its diverse membership have been illustrated clearly in the 
debate over the Charter adopted in November 2007. 
A central issue which ASEAN is contending with in a number of areas of activity is the 
appropriate relationship and balance between national sovereignty and the demands of 
regional cooperation. ASEAN was founded on the basis of the principle of ‘non-interference’ 
in the affairs of member states. In the tense environment of the late 1960s this principle was 
necessary to make any form of cooperation feasible. The growing awareness of the 
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significance for the membership of many transnational issues and the more ambitious goals 
involved in the ASEAN Economic Community have made it evident that individual 
sovereignty cannot be the only valid factor to be considered in regional relations. In practice 
ASEAN has already stepped across the boundaries of a strict adherence to this principle, for 
example in the statements by its foreign ministers in condemning the violent behaviour of the 
Myanmar regime (as they did strongly in September 2007).  
ASEAN, however, is still wrestling with the issue of how far it can go in revising the precise 
balance of sovereignty and collective interest and action in its cooperation plans and 
programs. As this paper has suggested, this tension has been evident in a number of areas 
including the need to increase adherence to economic agreements in relation to the ASEAN 
Economic Community and the question of whether ASEAN can go any further to pressure or 
censure the Myanmar regime. The tension is also very evident in relation to the planned 
ASEAN human rights body, the very concept of which suggests that there are indeed 
principles and values which can potentially be held in common by the ASEAN membership 
and peoples, and which cannot be considered to be held on a national basis only. These issues 
have not yet been resolved and are likely to continue to be prominent in ASEAN policy 
debates. 
ASEAN’s capacity to live up to its own declared goals—especially its commitments in 
relation to the ‘three pillars’ of the ASEAN Community adopted in the 2003 Bali Concord II 
—will be vital for the association’s external image and reputation. ASEAN has presented 
itself as a group which can offer examples to the wider region on how to pursue cooperation. 
It has asserted its claim to continue to be a ‘driving force’ in groupings including the ARF 
and EAS. However as ASEAN leaders have recognised, if ASEAN is seen to be unable to 
extend the substance of its internal cooperation (including the process of economic 
integration) and is unable to assert constructive influence among its members (for example 
through the human rights body it has committed itself to establishing) then it may come to 
lose cachet as a leading force in wider cooperation, which could be pursued increasingly by 
other major actors in more focused and activist groupings. 
These issues are all significant for Australia. Since the 1970s Australia has gained benefits 
from ASEAN’s contribution to stability in the region. Australia’s engagement with the major 
powers in East Asia has been facilitated by ASEAN’s annual dialogue process and its 
associated groups including the ARF and the East Asia Summit. Economic growth has 
broadened the basis for Australia’s engagement with the ASEAN region. The process of 
deeper integration can add to Australia’s political and economic involvements and Australia 
therefore has a major stake in ASEAN’s ongoing capacity to achieve its declared goals. 
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